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I. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of takings-the government taking of an interest in real 
property, either through eminent domain or through the exercise of the police 
power-has been the subject of continuous litigation for nearly a century. The 
past ten years have been particularly fruitful, as litigants struggle with the 
meaning and extent of the Fifth Amendment's Public Use Clause and the extent 
to which the overzealous exercise of the police power can sufficiently deprive 
a landowner of rights in property so that the property has been "taken" by 
regulation, ever since Justice Holmes opined in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon I that a regulation that goes "too far" is a constitutionally-proscribed 
taking. Thus, in the area of physical taking, we have the expansion of public 
use-use by the public-to include public purpose (Kelo v. City of New 
London2 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff), leaving very little room 
for landowner defense unless the physical taking can be proven "pretextual.,,4 
But it is in the area of regulatory taking that courts have added 
exponentially to the common law of takings, after breaking a near half-century 
of silence following Pennsylvania Coal during which state courts had chipped 
away at the doctrine nearly rendering it meaningless.5 Although arguably 
commencing with its bizarre April Fools Day decision in Village of Belle Terre 
v. Boraas,6 the United States Supreme Court fully engaged the regulatory 
taking doctrine in 1978 with its historic preservation decision in Penn Central 
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4. See Kelo, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see generally 99 Cents Stores v. 
Lancaster Redevelopment Authority, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Cnty. of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe 
Family Ltd. P'ship, 242 P.3d 1136 (Haw. 2010). 
5. FRED BOSSELMAN, DAVID CALLIES & JOHN BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL (1973). 
6. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
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Transportation Co. v. City o/New York,7 in which it established the doctrine of 
partial regulatory takings, depending upon the landowner's economic loss (and 
in particular the extent of interference with distinct, and later reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations) and the character of the regulation-
regulatory or physical. Fifteen years later, the court established the so-called 
"per se" or categorical rule on "total" regulatory takings: If a regulation left a 
landowner with no economically beneficial use, then the regulation must be 
treated as an exercise of eminent domain, unless the regulation codified the 
applicable law of nuisance, or a background principle of a state's law of 
property such as public trust or customary law.8 In between, the Court turned 
back several regulatory takings challenges on the ground the controversy was 
not "ripe" and so the Court could not undertake the traditional balancing test 
called for in Penn Central-a set of rulings that until recently has become a 
virtually insurmountable barrier to bringing regulatory takings challenges.9 
Finally, the United States Supreme Court established a "constitutional 
conditions" doctrine that forbids the application of land development 
conditions-impact fees and exactions, in-lieu fees, and mandatory dedications 
ofland for things like schools and parks-to a land development project. 10 This 
is so regardless of whether the exaction is monetary or an interest in land. I I 
This article explores some of the recent case law in these areas of takings, 
both physical and regulatory, and makes some predictions about the direction 
of takings law, bearing in mind Professor Lawrence Tribe's admonition that 
those who attempt to thus use a crystal ball may run the risk of later having to 
eat ground glass. Based on these trends and the author's 40 years of 
commentary, review, and analysis in this ever-fascinating field, I suggest that: 
(1) Land development conditions will continue to come under even more 
strict scrutiny for nexus and proportionality to the problems and needs 
generated by the development/developer so charged. This is particularly true 
with respect to affordable, workforce housing exactions-so-called 
"inclusionary zoning"-where the connection to market-priced housing 
projects has always been virtually non-existent. Only commercial 
developments generating a demonstrated need for low-income workers will 
successfully generate such mandatory housing set-asides. 
(2) Courts will continue to be confused by the difference, if any, between 
legislative and administrative/quasi-judicial exactions in the application of 
Nollan-Dollan-Koontz. If this last unresolved land development conditions 
7. 438 U.s. 104 (1978). 
8. See generally Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
9. See generally McDonald, Sommer, & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson Cnty 
Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
10. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); NoHan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 
U.S. 825 (1987). 
II. Koontz v. St. Johns Water Mgnt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
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issue reaches the United States Supreme Court, the Court is likely to find the 
distinction irrelevant. 
(3) There will be more use of consensual tools like the development 
agreement to resolve exaction issues. Such agreements take the exaction issue 
out of the Nollan-Dollan-Koontz context altogether. 
(4) Until the U.S. Supreme Court re-examines its five-to-four decision in 
Kelo, government-and especially redevelopment agencies-will continue to 
take private property on the flimsiest of public use premises, despite the 
temporary lull following the huge public outcry after its 2005 decision. I also 
predict the Court will soon re-examine that decision when an appropriate case 
arises. 
(5) Courts will continue to wrestle with exceptions to per se government 
takings liabilities, including so-called "background principles," such as the 
public trust doctrine, customary law, and established statutes. Like the nuisance 
exception, the exceptions will be selectively approved. 
(6) It is also virtually certain that government will increasingly endeavor 
to fit land use regulations under the doctrines of public trust and custom, so as 
to insulate especially categorical, per se, or total regulatory taking from a 
compensation remedy. 
(7) The Court will cut back the application of its ripeness rule, and 
particularly its second "state litigation" prong, following the lead of several 
federal circuit courts which have had quite enough of government regulatory 
taking and successfully reduce the impact of the ripeness doctrine by 
emphasizing its prudential-rather than jurisdictional-reach. 
(8) The result will be more partial takings cases decided on the merits, 
but with mixed results for landowners. Finding a partial taking will continue 
to be a challenge for landowners. 
(9) The lowering of the ripeness barrier will likely result in more 
successful landowner challenges when local regulation deprives a landowner 
of all economically beneficial use, as in open space and preservation districts 
and classifications. The result will be more conservation easements, whether 
negotiated or through eminent domain, in order to preserve private property for 
public enjoyment. 
(10) The Court needs to, and will, resolve the so-called "relevant parcel" 
or denominator issue, both with respect to partial and total regulatory takings. 
II. LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AFTER KOONTZ 
Academic literature has been filled with comment, criticism, and 
prediction following the summer 2013 Koontz decision. Virtually all land 
development triggers a need for public facilities to serve that development, 
immediately implicating the Nollan-Dolan (and now Koontz) requirements of 
nexus and proportionality: the close and proportionate connection to the 
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proposed development of the impact fee, exaction, or dedication of land 
required as a condition for government development approval. What follows 
is a summary of what Koontz adds (and what it does not add) to the Nollan-
Dolan nexus and proportionality requirements. 
A. Ramifications o/Koontz 
On June 25, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its long-anticipated 
decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 12 ending the 
considerable speculation about what the Court would do after taking the case 
up for review. Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Alito held that: (1) a 
government's demand for money or land from a land use permit applicant must 
satisfy the nexus and proportionality requirements of the Court's previous 
Nollan-Dolan requirements even when it denies the permit, and (2) the 
government's demand for property from a land use permit applicant must 
satisfy these Nollan-Dolan requirements even if the demand is for money-like 
impact fees, in-lieu fees, and other monetary exactions-rather than a 
dedication of an interest in real property, like an easement. What the Supreme 
Court clearly decided: 
(1) Questions of Timing. After Koontz, state and local governments will 
obviously be required to consider both nexus and proportionality when placing 
conditions on land development permits, whether or not such conditions require 
the dedication of interests in land or exactions of money. This is true whether 
the condition is precedent (agree to the condition, or no permit) or subsequent 
(here's your permit, but only on the following conditions). This is the one 
portion of the holding upon which the Court was unanimous. How this will 
play out in practice is not yet clear. Some commentators suggest either that 
state and local governments will simply stop negotiating entirely on land use 
permitting matters or will leave it to a landowner to offer sweeteners like 
workforce housing, oversized water and sewer pipes, and community 
recreational facilities to facilitate their permitting and rezoning requests. 13 The 
latter option would convert the land development permitting process into 
something akin to Virginia's infamous "proffer" system, which virtually 
requires such offers.14 
(2) Mitigation Fees. As the facts of Koontz dealt with a mitigation fee 
12. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). For extended treatment of these points, see Gregory M. Stein et aI, Stealing 
Your Property or Paying You/or Obeying the Law? Takings Exactions After Koontz v. St. Johns River Water 
Management, THE ACREL PAPERS, Mar. 2014 and David Callies, Koontz Redux: Where We Are and What's 
Left, PLAN. & ENVTL. LAW, Oct. 2013, at 7. 
13. See Michael M. Berger, Supreme Court Limits Land Development Permit Conditions, MANATT (June 
26, 2013), available at http://www.manatt.comlReal_Estate_and_Land_Use/Supreme_Court_ 
Limits_ Conditions.aspx; John D. Echevenia, A Legol Blow to Sustainable Development, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.coml20 13/06/27 /opinionla-Iegal-blow-to-sustainable-
development.html? _ r=O 
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2297 (2013). 
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and the Court specifically rejected the distinction between money and real 
property interests in applying the Nollan-Dolan nexus and proportionality 
standards, the decision clearly applies to mitigation fees charged to ameliorate 
the environmental effects of a proposed land development project. 
Proportionality in particular will be important here. There will be more use of 
such fees in place of land dedication requirements because the former will be 
more easily constitutionally-tailored to a development-driven need. Thus, for 
example, where a landowner is converting two acres to dry land, the fee should 
compensate for no more than those two acres. 15 Requiring a fee for the creation 
of a multi-acre wetland park would almost certainly be disproportionate. 
(3) In-Lieu Fees. Clearly the nexus and proportionality requirements of 
Nollan and Dolan are now applicable to fees often charged by local government 
in lieu of a dedication of a property interest per se. The Court specifically 
singled out such in-lieu fees in its opinion. Thus, for example, where local 
government charges a road-building fee as a condition for approving a 
residential subdivision rather than requiring dedication of road and street 
easements, the fee, like the easements, will have to bear a nexus to the need for 
roads generated by the subdivision, and the fee will have to be proportional to 
that generated need as well. 
(4) Impact Fees. The decision by its terms also applies to impact fees 
imposed by government to pay for public facilities such as schools, public 
parks, and wastewater treatment plants. There is no reasonable distinction 
among in-lieu fees, mitigation fees, and impact fees, since all are fees charged 
by government as a condition for land development approval (as distinguished 
from charges such as user fees and taxes, discussed below). All are embraced 
by the Court's term "monetary exaction," and thus all are now subject to the 
nexus and proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan. 
(5) Other "Exactions" vs. Taxes and User Fees. The dissent in Koontz 
makes much of the confusion between impact fees, on the one hand, and 
property taxes and user fees, on the other, that will become more significant as 
a result of the decision. However, as the Court majority rightly observes, the 
two are fundamentally different and based on fundamentally different legal 
theories. Land development conditions such as impact fees and other monetary 
exactions find their authority and roots in government exercise of the police 
power. Property taxes, on the other hand, are rooted in government authority 
to raise revenue-the power to tax, which requires no demonstration of nexus 
and proportionality to any activity by the taxpayer. User fees are merely 
charges levied on users for services rendered by the charging government, like 
building permit fees. While it is always conceivable that the decision could be 
interpreted as an attempt to apply intermediate scrutiny to all public finance 
15. Jessica Owley, Late to the Game: Koontz and whether you can have a takings claim withoUl an actual 
takings, LAND USE PROF BLOG (July 1,2013), available at hnp:lllawprofessors.typepad.comlland _use 
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decisions, there has been no such broader scrutiny in the twenty-seven states 
already using stricter, intermediate scrutiny for monetary exactions. The 
dissent is probably better read as a concern that the distinction cannot be made 
on the ground and that confusion will reign about whether taxes and fees are 
also subject to stricter scrutiny. On the other hand, perhaps the dissent would 
like to subject all public finance to stricter scrutiny and is using the Koontz 
dissent as a vehicle for commencing just that. 16 
(6) Legislative vs. Non-Legislative Conditions. A key remaining issue 
with respect to land development conditions is whether different standards 
apply if the land development condition is legislatively, rather than 
administratively or quasi-judicially, imposed. While at least one sitting Justice 
on the Court has opined in a certiorari petition denial dissent that there is no 
defensible difference, other judges have suggested that deference to legislative 
determinations should lower the level of scrutiny applied to such legislative 
exactions as compared with administrative or quasi-judicial, one-off exactions. 
The Court has not yet addressed the question of whether Nollan, Dolan, 
and now Koontz apply to these more generalized types of exactions-in fact, it 
has expressly distinguished them. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
opinion for the Court in Dolan draws a sharp line between "essentially 
legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city" and "an 
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit 
on an individual parcel.,,17 The Court has had no occasion to decide whether 
the latter category of cases also requires review under the "essential nexus" and 
"rough proportionality" tests of Nollan and Dolan. Until it reaches this 
question, it is likely that government entities will endeavor to adopt more 
generalized exactions that look like legislation. These government bodies will 
also try to persuade courts that exactions that are actually challenged by 
landowners are more legislative in nature than adjudicative, and thus not subject 
to the heightened Nollan-Dolan standard. 
The Court in Koontz did, however, suggest that it was aware of this 
distinction and attached some significance to it. The opinion notes that Nollan 
and Dolan apply "when [property] owners apply for land-use permits" and 
acknowledges that owners "are especially vulnerable to [this] type of coercion" 
during the permitting process. 18 It closes by noting "the special vulnerability 
16. Jonathan M. ZaslotT, Koontz and Exactions: Don't Worry, Be Happy, LEGAL PLANET (June 27, 
2013), available at http://legal-planet.org/20 l3/06/27Ikoontz-and-exactions-dont-worry-be-happy/. 
17. Dolan v. CityofTigard, 512 U.s. 374,385 (1994); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 
528, 546 (2005) ("Both Nollan and Dolan involved Fifth Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative land-
use exactions-specifically, government demands that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public 
access to her property as a condition of obtaining a development permit. "). Justice Kagan, in her Koontz 
dissent, seemed uncertain of the Court's present view on this point, noting, "[m)aybe today's majority accepts 
that distinction; or then again, maybe not." Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
18. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594. 
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of land use pennit applicants to extortionate demands for money.,,19 This 
language is not, of course, conclusive.2o 
There is a split of authority in the lower courts as to whether to apply the 
Nollan and Dolan tests to legislative detenninations.21 In his dissent to the 
denial of certiorari in Parking Association of Georgia, Inc. v. City of A Ilanta, 22 
Justice Thomas noted that "[t]he lower courts are in conflict over whether 
Dolan's test for property regulation should be applied in cases where the 
alleged taking occurs through an Act of the legislature. ,,23 In Dolan where the 
Court added a second requirement to evaluating the constitutionality of 
governmental exactions, it left unclear what distinction, if any, exists between 
adjudicative and legislative exactions. 
While the Court has not conclusively settled the issue of whether 
legislative exactions are subject to Nollan-Dolan analysis, many courts have 
ruled that the Dolan test does not apply to legislative decisions. For instance, 
in Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 24 the 
Supreme Court of Arizona held that "[b ]ecause the Scottsdale case involves a 
generally applicable legislative decision by the city, the court of appeals 
thought Dolan did not apply. We agree, though the question has not been 
settled by the Supreme Court.,,25 The Supreme Court of Georgia adopted 
similar reasoning in rejecting a Dolan analysis of a legislatively enacted barrier 
and landscaping zoning requirement. 26 In Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation 
District,27 the Supreme Court of Colorado also held that the Nollan-Dolan test 
did not apply, because the impact fee exacted was based on legislation.28 In 
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,29 a case often cited on these issues, the Supreme 
Court of California noted that: 
19. Id. at 2603. 
20. Some state courts have been more willing to treat exactions found in legislation more like ad hoc 
administrative exactions. For example, the Texas Supreme Court has stated: 
We are not convinced. While we recognize that an ad hoc decision is more likely to constitute a 
taking than general legislation, we think it entirely possible that the government could "gang up" on 
particular groups to force extractions that a majority of constituents would not only tolerate but 
applaud, so long as burdens they would otherwise bear were shifted to others. 
Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates L.P., 135 S.W.3d 620, 641 (Tex. 2004). 
21. See, e.g., Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, SIS U.S. 1116, 1117 (1995) (Thomas,J., 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari). These issues have been discussed by a range of commentators. See, 
e.g., David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property Rights Have 
Changedfrom Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. 
REv. 523, 572-73 (1999); David L. Callies & Glenn H. Sonoda, Providing Infrastructure for Smart Growth: 
Land Development Conditions, 43 IDAHO L. REv. 351,367 (2007); Christopher T. Goodin, Dolan v. City of 
Tigard and the Distinction Between Administrative and Legislative Exactions: "A Distinction Without a 
Constitutional Difference," 28 U. HAw. L. REv. 139, 148 (2005); Jane C. Needleman, Exactions: Exploring 
Exactly When Nollan and Dolan Should Be Triggered, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 1563,1574 (2006). 
22. SIS U.S. 1116 (1995). 
23. Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc., 515 U.S. at 1117. 
24. 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1997). 
25. Id. at 1000. 
26. Parking Ass'n of Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200,203 n.3 (Ga. 1994). 
27. 19 P.3d 687 (Colo. 2001). 
28. Id. at 695-96. 
29. 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996). 
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it is not at all clear that the rationale (and the heightened standard of scrutiny) of 
Nollan and Dolan applies to cases in which the exaction takes the fonn of a 
generally applicable development fee or assessment-cases in which the courts 
have deferred to legislative and political processes to fonnulate "public 
program[s] adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good.,,30 
Other jurisdictions, however, have applied the Nollan-Dolan test in the 
context ofiegislative exactions, both physical and monetary. In Schultz v. City 
of Grants Pass,31 the Oregon Court of Appeals applied the Dolan test to a city 
ordinance requiring the dedication of rights-of-way for street widening 
purposes.32 The court reasoned that: 
the character of the restriction remains the type that is subject to the analysis in 
Dolan. In drawing its distinction between the legislative land use decisions that 
are entitled to a presumption of validity and the exactions that are not, the 
Supreme Court noted that what triggers the heightened scrutiny of exactions is 
the fact that they are "not simply a limitation on the use" to which an owner may 
put his or her property, but rather a requirement that the owner deed portions of 
the property to the local government. 33 
In Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad v. South Dakota,34 the United 
States District Court for the District of South Dakota considered a state statute 
requiring railroad companies to dedicate an easement in order to obtain 
development permits. The court held that the legislative nature of the exaction 
"does not mean that a regulatory taking analysis is the wrong framework for 
this case.,,35 The Supreme Court of Washington and the Illinois Court of 
Appeals have also applied the Nollan-Dolan test to legislative exactions.36 
Finally, Justice Thomas, in his dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in 
Parking Association of Georgia v. City of Atlanta noted above, questioned the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction in the context of exactions: 
It is hardly surprising that some courts have applied Dolan's rough 
proportionality test even when considering a legislative enactment. It is not clear 
why the existence of a taking should tum on the type of governmental entity 
responsible for the taking. A city council can take property just as well as a 
planning commission can. Moreover, the general applicability of the ordinance 
30. /d. at 447 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
31. 884 P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
32. /d.; see also J.e. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas Cnty., 887 P.2d 360 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
33. Schultz, 884 P.2d at 573, (citing Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)). 
34. 236 F. Supp. 2d 989 (D.S.D. 2002), aff'd in part, 362 F.3d 512 (8th Cir. 2004). 
35. /d. at 1026. 
36. Sparks v. Douglas Cnty., 904 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (holding a road dedication 
requirement reviewable under Dolan); Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1995) (applying Nollan-Dolan analysis to a legislative land dedication requirement); see also Town of Flower 
Mound v. Stafford Estates, L.P., 135 S.W.3d 620, 641 (Tex. 2004) (suggesting, without so holding, that the 
court also favors applying the Nollan-Dolan test to legislatively-imposed exactions). In Town of Flower Mound 
the court stated that: 
/d. 
We think that the Town's argument, and the few courts that have accepted it, make too much of the 
Supreme Court's distinction in Dolan. By the same token, we need not risk error in the opposite 
direction by undertaking to decide here in the abstract whether the Dolan standard should apply to 
all 'legislative' exactions-whatever that really means-imposed as a condition of development. 
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should not be relevant in a takings analysis .... The distinction between sweeping 
legislative takings and particularized administrative takings appears to be a 
distinction without a constitutional difference. 3 7 
51 
One repercussion-implicit in the Court's opinion and raised squarely by 
the dissent and by the Florida Supreme Court38_is whether Koontz increases 
the incentives for municipal entities to deny requests for pennits outright rather 
than negotiate with applicants. All of the Justices appear to agree that the St. 
Johns River Water Management District would not have faced the heightened 
standard of Nollan and Dolan, if it had simply denied Koontz's permit 
application outright.39 If government bodies therefore become unwilling to 
negotiate, then Koontz will generate a "lose-lose" outcome: Landowners 
willing to trade away a property right (or money) in exchange for a permit will 
be unable to reach that agreement with government bodies otherwise willing to 
issue a permit in exchange for the owner's voluntary relinquishment of a 
property right. A desirable exchange, benefiting the landowner, the 
government entity, and presumably the greater community, will fail to occur 
because of the government's fear that its offer, even if rejected, will attract the 
heightened scrutiny that Koontz now requires. 
(7) Decisions Post-Koontz. While several courts have rendered land 
development conditions opinions following Koontz, an appellate court has yet 
to be confronted with a question squarely challenging any of Koontz's 
significant holdings: that in the land development context (1) Nollan-Dolan 
apply to fees as well as interests in property, (2) Nollan-Dolan apply even if the 
permit is ultimately denied, or (3) that there is no distinction between conditions 
precedent and subsequent. 
Koontz has been often cited for its restatement of the Supreme Court's 
37. Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117-18 (l995)(Thomas, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari). 
38. The Court raises this issue somewhat obliquely, noting, "[e]ven if respondent would have been 
entirely within its rights in denying the permit for some other reason, that greater authority does not imply a 
lesser power to condition permit approval on petitioner's forfeiture of his constitutional rights." Id. at 2596. 
The dissent is more direct, with Justice Kagan stating, "[i]f a local government risked a lawsuit every time it 
made a suggestion to an applicant about how to meet permitting criteria, it would cease to do so; indeed, the 
government might desist altogether from communicating with applicants." Id. at 26\0 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
She continues by observing, "if each idea or proposal offered in the back-and-forth of reconciling diverse 
interests ... triggered Nollan-Dolan scrutiny ... no local government official with a decent lawyer would have 
a conversation with a developer." Id. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The Florida Supreme Court also raised 
this concern: 
[A]gencies will opt to simply deny permits outright without discussion or negotiation rather than 
risk the crushing costs of litigation. Property owners will have no opportunity to amend their 
applications or discuss mitigation options because the regulatory entity will be unwilling to subject 
itself to potential liability. Land development in certain areas of Florida would come to a standstill. 
St. Johns River Water Mgrnt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1231 (Fla. 2011). 
39. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596; id. at 2609-10 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also City of Monterey v. Del 
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999). 
Id. 
The rule applied in Dolan . .. was not designed to address, and is not readily applicable to, the much 
different questions arising where, as here, the landowner's challenge is based not on excessive 
exactions but on denial of development. We believe, accordingly, that the rough-proportionality test 
of Dolan is inapposite to a case such as this one. 
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unconstitutional conditions doctrine.4o For example, in Powell v. County oj 
Humboldt,41 the Court of Appeals of California relied upon Koontz's reiteration 
(in Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc. 42) "that the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine 'protects the Fifth Amendment right to just compensationjor property 
the government takes when owners apply for land-use permits.' "43 The case 
resulted from a landowner's challenge of the constitutionality of a county 
general plan requirement that they provide an aircraft overflight easement as a 
condition for obtaining a building permit, asserting that such requirement 
constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. The court held 
that the easement requirement would not constitute a total taking under Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, a permanent physical invasion under 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., or a partial taking under Penn 
Central, or a permanent physical invasion under Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp.44 As a result, the court rejected the landowners' 
takings claim for its failure to satisfy the threshold determination that the 
condition would rise to the level of a compensable taking under the Fifth 
Amendment ifit had occurred outside of the permitting process.45 
In Horne v. United States Department oj Agriculture,46 the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that a farmer, who was deemed to have violated a 
marketing order and was subsequently fined, could bring a takings claim 
subject to Nolan-Dol/an analysis. The court reasoned that, although imposition 
of penalties and fines does not run afoul of the Taking Clause, the penalties in 
Horne were directly linked to a specific governmental action-the reserve 
requirement-which the Homes alleged constituted a taking.47 As a result, the 
court found Koontz to be instructive because it addresses the issue of how to 
analyze a takings claim when a monetary exaction, rather then a specific piece 
of property, is subject to the claim. The court ultimately concluded that the 
reserve requirement had both a sufficient nexus and proportionality and 
therefore was not a taking. 
In Moongate Water Co. v. City oj Las Cruces,48 the New Mexico Court of 
Appeals rejected a landowner's argument that, under Koontz, awarding costs to 
the government after a failed inverse condemnation challenge "impermissibly 
40. See City ofN. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, LLC, Nos. 58530, 59162,2014 WL 1226443 (Nev. 
Mar. 21, 2014); Merscorp Holdings, Inc. v. Malloy, No. X04HHDCVI36043132S, 2014 WL 486952, at ·12-
13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 10,2014); Muhammad ex reI. J.S. v. Abington Twp. Police Dep't, No. CIY.A. 13-
716,2014 WL 3818492 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1,2014); Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. 
2014) (Bradley, J. dissenting). 
41. 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 
42. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
43. Id. at 1439 (citing Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594). 
44. !d. at 754; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
45. Powell, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 758. 
46. 750 F.3d 1128 (2014). 
47. Id. at 1137. 
48. 329 P.3d 727 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014). 
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chills a property owner's exercise of the right to seek just compensation for a 
claimed taking of his or her property.,,49 Moongate had brought a regulatory 
taking action challenging the City's annexation of several undeveloped tracts 
of land, which removed the tracts from Moongate' s certified service area, 
bringing them within an area the city had committed itself to servicing. After 
the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that Moongate's loss of the right to 
serve was not a compensable taking, the City was awarded costs. The sole 
question before the Court of Appeals was "whether the Eminent Domain 
Code ... permits costs to be taxed against a property owner who exercises the 
constitutional or statutory right to seek just compensation for a taking ofprivate 
property.,,50 In answering the question in the affirmative and distinguishing the 
case at bar from Koontz, the court observed that Koontz "was clearly concerned 
with coercive and 'extortionate' government conduct in the context ofland-use 
permitting" and that the case before it was simply a question about "whether a 
prevailing defendant in an inverse condemnation action may recover its 
litigation costs pursuant to a rule of procedure expressly incorporated into the 
statute that governs those proceedings.,,51 
Courts have cited Koontz for its restatement of the Supreme Court's 
position that "it is beyond dispute that' [t] axes and user fees ... are not takings'" 
and Koontz therefore "does not affect the ability of governments to impose 
property taxes, user fees, and similar laws and regulations that may impose 
financial burdens on property owners.,,52 Also relevant to the Court's 
discussion on taxes, Koontz has been relied upon for the Court's remarks that 
"we have repeatedly found takings where the government, by confiscating 
financial obligations, achieved a result that could have been obtained by 
imposing a tax."53 
Courts have also cited Koontz for a variety of other reasons not 
specifically related to land development condition, such as the continued 
strength of private property rights under the federal constitution, 54 and that 
water districts are among the government entities from which the takings clause 
is designed to protect citizens.55 
49. ld. at 733. 
50. ld. at 728. 
51. ld. at 733. 
52. See Hotze v. Sebelius, No. 4:13-CV-01318, 2014 WL 109407, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 10,2014) 
(rejecting employer and employee's challenge of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
mandate as a taking on the grounds that the Supreme Court already determined that the mandate constituted a 
tax and therefore it was not a taking.); see also Russo v. Township of Plumsted, 2014 WL 3459066, at *8 
(2014); Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Department Of Public Utilities, 7 N.E.3d 1045, 1055 (Mass. 2014). 
53. Cerajeski v. Zoeller, 735 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2013). 
54. Lemire v. State Dep't of Ecology, 309 P.3d 395, 409 n.17 (Wash. 2013). 
55. Cedar River Water & Sewer Dist. v. King Cnty., 315 P.3d 1065, 1089 (Wash. 2013) (McCloud, J., 
concurring). 
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B. Development by Agreement 
A way out of the constitutional peril in which government finds itself over 
land development conditions after Koontz is the development agreement. 56 
Indeed, there is evidence such agreements are likely to see more use. 
Development agreements are essentially statutorily-authorized bilateral 
constraints between local governments and landowners for the guidance of a 
multiphase land development project. Authorized by statute in thirteen states-
most prominently Hawaii and California-the development agreement is 
designed to accomplish several purposes: 
(1) Permit local government to require public facilities and improvements 
beyond those that it may legally require as generated by a proposed land 
development project. 
(2) Permit local government greater flexibility in regulating large, 
, multiphase projects extending over many years. 
(3) Strengthen the public planning process and encourage public and 
private participation in comprehensive planning. 
(4) Reduce the economic cost of development and allow for the orderly 
planning of public facilities and services and the allocation of costs. 
For example, these and other public purposes are all set out in Hawaii's 
Development Agreement Statute57 which, according to its purpose clause, finds 
that: 
The lack of certainty in the development process can result in a waste of 
resources, escalate the cost of housing and other development to the consumer, 
and discourage investment in and commitment to comprehensive planning. 
Predictability would encourage maximum efficient utilization of resources at the 
least economic cost to the public. 58 
All of this is due to the increasing sophistication and number of land use 
regulations and the expenditure of "considerable sums of money" in the land 
development approval process. Together with the opinion of the Hawaii 
Supreme Court in County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Insurance Co.,59 
(colloquially known as the Nukolii case), it is these reasons that persuaded the 
Hawaii State Legislature in the mid-1980s to make the above findings and pass 
a development agreement statute. 
Hawaii is far from alone in enacting such laws in response to local 
government need for public facilities guarantees and landowner need for a 
measure of legally vested rights. In 1980, California passed a similar 
development agreements statute in response to its own state Supreme Court 
56. See DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., DEVELOPMENT BY AGREEMENT: A TOOL KIT FOR LAND DEVELOPERS 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (American Bar Association, Section of State and Local Government Law, 2012). 
57. HAW. REv. STAT. § 46·1-46·25 (2014). 
58. Id. § 46·121 (2014). 
59. 653 P.2d 766 (Haw. 1982). The Court made it difficult for a landowner to obtain a legal rigbt to 
proceed with a project without expending vast sums of money before obtaining a "last discretionary permit" 
for land development. Jd.at 775. 
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holding that a landowner lacked vested rights even after spending millions of 
dollars in land improvements.60 So popular is the development agreement as a 
vehicle for guiding planning and development, particularly of multi-stage 
projects, that by the early 1990s over half the local governments in California 
had negotiated and executed more than 700 such agreements.61 Moreover, not 
a single reported case has found fault with a development agreement. Indeed, 
it was not until 2000 that California courts were confronted with a direct 
challenge to such statutorily authorized development agreements, and a court 
of appeals soundly upheld them.62 Virtually all commentary on development 
agreements is uniformly positive, from its early inception63 to the present.64 
C. Mandatory Affordable Housing Conditions: A Subset of Koontz 
Because linkage fees for affordable or workforce housing are a form of 
exaction, they are subject to the "essential nexus" takings test of Nollan.65 
Under Nollan, "a permit condition that serves the same legitimate police-power 
purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if the 
refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking. ,,66 In addition, under 
Nollan, the government bears the burden of proving this nexus.67 Linkage fees 
satisfy this test "only if the municipality can show that development contributes 
to the housing problem68 the linkage exaction is intended to remedy. "69 
Most attempts at mandatory set-asides suffer from several defects. First, 
they often "exact" the workforce or affordable housing increments at premature 
and unconstitutional stages in the land development process: rezoning. The 
60. Avco Cmty. Developers Inc. v. S. Coast Reg'l Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546,553 (Ca1.l976). 
61. Daniel J. Curtin & Scott A. Edelstein, Development Agreement Practice in California and Other 
States, 22 STETSON L. REv.76I, 766(1993). 
62. Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 740, 745-
46 (2000). 
63. See generally LINDELL L. MARSH, DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 
(Douglas R. Porter ed. 1989); Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping From the 
Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. REv. 277 (1990); Judith W. Wegner, Moving Toward the 
Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, the Theoretical Foundations of Government 
Land Use Deals, 65 N. C. L. REV. 957 (1987). 
64. DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK ON DEVELOPMENT 
AGREEMENTS, ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS, LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS, VESTED RIGHTS, AND THE 
PROVISION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES 91-111 (2003). 
65. NoHan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); see Commercial Builders ofN. Cal. v. 
City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991). 
66. Nol/an, 483 U.S. at 836 (emphasis added). 
67. Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994). 
68. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, § 9.23 (5th ed. 2003). A "housing problem" is the typical 
interest which the counties of Hawai 'i identify as a legitimate state interest in their ordinances. See, e.g., MAUl, 
HAW., CODE § 2.94.010 (2007) ("The council finds that there is a critical shortage of affordable housing in the 
county."); HAWAII, HAW., CODE § 11-2(5) (2010) (setting forth the objective of requiring "large resort and 
industrial enterprises to address related affordable housing needs as a condition of rezoning approvals, based 
upon current economic and housing conditions"). In Association of Owners v. City and Cnty of Honolulu, the 
Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i acknowledged the legitimacy of this interest in the context of the 
challenge to a condominium declaration, stating that "affordable housing and public parking for downtown 
Honolulu were important to the welfare of the community." 742 P.2d 974, 985 (Haw. Ct. App. 1987). 
69. MAN DELKER, supra note 68, at § 9.23. 
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premise upon which any and all legal land development conditions--exactions, 
dedications, impact fees, in lieu fees-rests is that they are development driven; 
the contemplated project will require public facilities for which the landowner 
or developer must contribute a fair share. 
[I]t is generally agreed that the law applicable to impact fees, exactions, and in 
lieu fees, as well as to compulsory dedications, is similar, given that they all 
represent land development conditions levied at some point in the land 
development process. such as subdivision plat approval. shoreline management 
permit application. building permit application. occupancy permit application. 
or utility connection. 70 
Rezoning, while it may be a necessary precedent to land use and 
development, neither creates nor drives the need for public facilities, including 
affordable housing. It is therefore unconstitutional to require exactions of any 
kind as a condition for change of use by means of zoning map amendments 
(rezoning): 
Finally, we note again that such land development conditions-whether 
dedications, exactions, or impact fees-are development driven. Without a 
demonstrable and relatively immediate need for such facilities it is 
unconstitutional to "charge" them. Therefore, levying such land development 
conditions on rezoning alone is almost certainly unconstitutional. The fees and 
other conditions should be levied or charged at some development permit or 
subdivision approval step. rather than as conditions for land reclassification. 71 
Second, unless the local government can demonstrate a clear rational and 
proportional nexus between market price development and the imposition of 
below-market cost housing set-asides, it may not require these set-asides at any 
stage in the land development process. What scant precedent exists for 
imposing such exactions on residential developments does so only when the 
local government requiring such exactions provides sufficient incentive to 
offset all or a substantial portion of the cost of the mandatory affordable 
housing set-asides. As to the imposition of such costs on non-residential 
development, the local government must demonstrate that the development 
generates a need for such housing, generally of the workforce variety, and that 
the amount to be set aside is proportionate to that need. As one commentator 
recently noted in the commercial housing set-aside context: 
A number of cities have adopted exaction programs that require downtown 
office and commercial developers to provide housing for lower-income groups or 
contribute to a municipal fund for the construction of such housing. [Such] 
programs satisfy the nexus test only if the municipality can show that downtown 
development contributes to the housing problem the linkage exaction is intended 
to remedy. 72 
As previously noted, Nollan's nexus test, or a close equivalent, applies to 
70. CALLIES, supra note 64, at 6 (emphasis added); see also MANDELKER, supra note 68, at § 9.11. 
71. DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND 
USE 254 (4th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). 
72. MA,>;DELKER, supra note 68, at § 9.23 (emphasis added). 
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linkage fees. For example, in Commercial Builders of Northern California v. 
City of Sacramento,73 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an 
ordinance, which imposed a linkage "fee in connection with the issuance of 
permits for nonresidential development of the type that will generate jobs,,,74 
(in other words, a workforce affordable housing requirement) was 
constitutional under Nollan.75 Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance directly on 
Nollan grounds: lack of nexus or connection between the development and the 
affordable housing condition. First, the court addressed the holding of Nollan: 
that where there is no evidence of a nexus between the development and the 
problem that the exaction seeks to address, the exaction cannot be upheldJ6 
The court then explained that "the [o]rdinance was implemented only after a 
detailed study revealed a substantial connection between development and the 
problem to be addressed."77 
The Court related at some length what the City of Sacramento did to 
establish the "substantial connection between the development and the 
problem" of affordable housing.78 First, the city commissioned a study of the 
need for low-income housing, the effect of non-residential development on the 
demand for such housing, and the appropriateness of exacting fees in 
conjunction with such developments to pay for housing: 
[The study] estimat[ed] the percentage of new workers in the developments that 
would qualify as low-income workers and would require housing. [The study] 
also calculated fees for development . . . Also as instructed, however, in the 
interest of erring on the side of conservatism in exacting the fees, it reduced [ the] 
final calculation[] by about one-half. Based upon this study, the City of 
Sacramento enacted the Housing Trust Fund Ordinance [which] ... inc1ud[ed] 
the finding that nonresidential development is 'a major factor in attracting new 
employees to the region' and that the influx of new employees' creates a need 
for additional housing in the City. ' Pursuant to these findings, the Ordinance 
imposes a fee in connection with the issuance of permits for nonresidential 
development of the type that will generate jobs. 79 
Consequently, the court found "that the nexus between the fee provision 
here at issue, designed to further the city's legitimate interest in housing, and 
the burdens caused by commercial development is sufficient to pass 
constitutional muster.,,80 
Even courts that decline to apply heightened scrutiny to legislatively 
imposed fees in the affordable housing context nonetheless apply some form of 
Nollan's essential nexus test. For instance, in San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and 
73. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
74. [d. at 873. 
75. [d. at 875. 
76. Id. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. 
79. Commercial Builders o/N. Cal., 941 F.2d at 873. 
80. [d. at 875. 
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County of San Francisco, 8 1 although the California Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that legislatively imposed, ministerial impact fees are not subject to the tests of 
Nollan-Dolan,82 the court nonetheless required that there "be a 'reasonable 
relationship' between the fee and the deleterious impacts for mitigation of 
which the fee is collected."83 Similarly, in Holmdel Builders Association v. 
Township of Holmdel,84 even though the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
concluded that legislative fees are not subject to the heightened scrutiny of its 
"but-for," "rational-nexus" test, it still required some relationship between the 
development and the harm caused.85 The court essentially explained that the 
"relationship between the private activity that gives rise to the exaction and the 
public activity to which it is applied," must be "founded on [an] actual, albeit 
indirect and general, impact. "86 
The California Court of Appeals echoed the decision in San Remo by 
denying the Nollan-Dolan strict scrutiny test to a legislatively enacted 
ordinance but still requiring a reasonable relationship between the ordinance's 
means and ends.87 In Building Industrial Association of Central California v. 
City of Patterson,88 the city entered into a development agreement that 
provided for an affordable housing in-lieu fee of $734 per market rate unit to 
be paid by the developer to the city with a caveat that allowed for a "reasonably 
justified" increase in the fee based on the findings of an updated affordable 
housing fee analysis. 89 In accordance with the updated analysis, the city raised 
the affordable housing fee from $734 to a whopping $20,946 per market rate 
unit.90 The court held that the development agreement's increased affordable 
housing in-lieu fee was not "reasonably justified" because the fee had no 
reasonable relationship to the "deleterious public impact" the planned sub-
division would have on affordable housing.91 
In developing the affordable housing in-lieu fee, the city examined 
subsidies that would bridge the affordability gap between moderate-, low-, and 
very low-income households and the price of market rate units. The city 
calculated the total subsidy that would be required to bridge the affordability 
gap based on the requirement of 642 units of affordable housing allocated to 
the city by the 2001 to 2002 Regional Housing Needs Assessment for Stanislaus 
81. 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002). 
82. Id. at 102-03. 
83. Id. at 103. 
84. 583 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990). 
85. Id. at 288. 
86. Id. 
87. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n ofCen!. Cal. v. City of Patterson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 63,72-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
88. 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
89. Id. at 66. 
90. Id. at 65. 
91. Id. at 65, 72. "The level of constitutional scrutiny applied by the court in San Remo must be applied 
to City's affordable housing in-lieu fee and is one of the legal requirements incorporated into the Development 
Agreement." Id. at 73. 
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County. This total subsidy of $73.5 million was spread over the 3,507 
unentitled units left to be constructed according to the city's general plan. 
Although this calculation has a direct relationship to the city's overall need for 
affordable housing, it has no relationship to the effects of a new development 
on that need. 
While the court never comments on the constitutionality of the original 
fee,92 in concluding that the increased fee violated the development agreement, 
the court clearly finds that even outside of the development agreement context, 
the new in-lieu housing fee is impermissible; "the fee calculations ... do not 
support a finding that the fees to be borne by Developer's project bore any 
reasonable relationship to any deleterious impact associated with the project.,,93 
Only one court has rejected the application of either a nexus or reasonable 
relationship test. In California Building Industry Association v. City of San 
Jose,94 the California Court of Appeals overturned the trial court, which had 
applied a nexus standard to strike down a mandatory affordable housing 
requirement imposed by the City on a residential development. According to 
the Court of Appeals, the standard is whether the housing set-aside requirement 
was justified under the general welfare clause of the City's police power-like 
a traditional zoning ordinance-not whether there was a nexus or reasonable 
relationship of the housing requirement to any need or problem generated by 
the market-price housing development. The court looked to California's 
Housing Accountability Act, which recognizes lack of hOUSing as a critical 
problem and requires local government to address regional housing needs 
through implementing housing elements ina community general plan. The City 
of San Jose responded by passing the challenged inclusionary housing 
ordinance, with "incentives" for affordable housing constructed on-site and 
waivers if there was no reasonable relationship between the impact of the 
proposed residential development and the affordable housing set-asides 
required by the ordinance. This case is at odds with City of Patterson95 and 
virtually every other case passing on development exactions, where, as 
discussed above, another California Court of Appeals found no reasonable 
relationship between a large affordable housing mitigation fee and a market 
price residential development, and also arguably with the Ninth Circuit's 
decision in Commercial Builders,96 which found such set-asides valid for 
workforce housing generated by the commercial development. Remarkably, 
the case does not cite Commercial Builders at all. 
In sum, there are practically no instances of courts countenancing naked 
92. City of Patterson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 67-68 (discussing where the affordable housing fee would be 
used as leverage with the federal government to receive grants and loans). 
93. Id. at 73-74. 
94. 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) cert. granted 307 P.3d 878 (Cal. 2013). 
95. See generally City of Patterson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 63. 
96. Commercial Builders ofN. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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linkage or affordable housing set-aside requirements on residential 
developments without substantial bonuses, usually consisting of significant 
density increases. Indeed, a recent report from nonprofit coalitions on housing 
in California concludes that most California local governments with 
inclusionary affordable housing programs provide a range of substantial density 
bonuses and other advantages to developers who are required to provide 
affordable housing, and the average percentage of such housing requirements 
is closer to ten percent, with twenty percent being at the high end of the 
spectrum.97 This experience is replicated in surveys of other jurisdictions.98 
As to workforce housing exactions or set-asides on commercial 
development, the principal-indeed virtually only-federal case approving 
such set-asides did so only after the local government requiring such set-asides 
engaged in thorough and detailed studies of the workforce jobs required and 
generated by the proposed commercial development, which requirements were 
then cut in half. If the government wishes to enact such an ordinance mandating 
affordable housing set-asides or fees on commercial development (not zoning, 
but actual development), despite evidence of marginal success in actively 
providing affordable housing, then it should consider the basis upon which the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld such an ordinance passed by the City of 
Sacramento and: 
(1) undertake a detailed study of the precise need for workforce housing; 
(2) on a project by project basis; 
(3) calculate the precise fee or set-aside each project requires; 
(4) cut that fee in half before applying it to a given project; and 
(5) provide meaningful density bonuses, expedited permitting and 
grants.99 
Thus, provided the set-asides or fees are (1) applied to developments 
which drive a need for affordable housing and (2) set low enough to survive a 
proportionality challenge, this may then produce a percentage-although likely 
not a large one--ofthe affordable, low income, workforce housing needs of the 
community. 100 
III. CONDEMNATION: EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT 
The U.S. Constitution's public use requirement is virtually always decided 
in favor of the government in eminent domain challenges, unless the 
97. Non-Profit Hous. Assoc. ofN. Cal. & Cal. Coal. for Rural Hous., Inclusionary Housing in California: 
30 Years of Innovation (2004); Nico Calavita, foreward to Affordable by Choice: Trends in California 
Inclusionary Housing Programs (2007), available at http://www.wellesleyinstitute.comlwp-
contentiuploads/2013/01INPH-IHinCA2006.pdf. 
98. DOUGLAS PORTER, INCLUSIONARY ZONING FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING (2004). 
99. See generally Commercial Builders ofN Cal., 941 F.2d 872. 
100. For a thorough analysis of set-asides in the context of proportionate share theory and practice, see 
ARTHUR C. NELSON, ET AL., A GUIDE TO IMPACT FEES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY (2008). 
2014] Through a Glass Clearly 61 
determination is "pretextual" as was the case in. C. & J. Coupe, I 0 I and noted 
in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Kelo, affirming that public use and public 
purpose are one and the same for government condemnation purposes. Only 
the value of the condemned property or interest in property remains as a major 
issue. 102 The backlash over Ke/o has been considerable and there is apparently 
some sentiment on the Court to revisit the public use/public purpose issue. l03 
A. Public Use Under Kelo v. City of New London 
While the definition of public use has not changed significantly in the past 
twenty years, public perception ofthat change has. The federal rule, anticipated 
in Berman v. Parker, 104 was established in Hawaii Housing Authority ("HHA") 
v. Midkiff, 105 and holds that so long as a public use (redefined as public purpose) 
is conceivable and possible, even if it never comes to pass, federal courts will 
accept it. The U.S. Supreme Court simply reiterated that rule in the 2005 Kelo 
case, adding that economic revitalization was a sufficient public purpose to 
justify the taking of a non-blighted single family home under local eminent 
domain statutes. 106 A number of state courts had established a more stringent 
test than the Supreme Court of Connecticut, (which the Court affirmed in Kelo), 
which, of course, the states may do since further protecting property rights 
beyond the minimum under federal law is a matter for the states, as indeed the 
Supreme Court noted in Kelo. Nevertheless, the decision set off a firestorm of 
criticism, leading to legislation and constitutional amendments in two-thirds of 
the states to establish a more strict public purpose test to avoid results such as 
that in Kelo. 
B. The State of the Federal Law on Public Use Before Kelo: 
Berman v. Parker and HHA v. Midkiff 
The members of the Court expressed different views on the historical 
antecedents of public use and how far back to go in deriving an appropriate 
definition to apply in Kelo. l07 Nevertheless, all (except perhaps Justice 
IO\. Cnty. of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family Ltd. P'ship, 242 P.3d 1136, 1142 (Haw. 2010). 
102. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 490-94 (Kennedy, 1., concurring). 
103. See generally Steven A. Hirsh & Douglas G. Zimmennan, Kelo's Ever-Present Threat: A Call 10 
Action/or Legislative Relief, 43 ARIZ. ATT'y 31 (2006); Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo's Trail: A Survey 
o/State and Federal Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703 (2011); Gregory 
J. Robson, Kelo v. City of New London: lIS Ironic Impact on Takings Authority, 44 URB. LAW. 865 (2012); 
Ilya Somin, The Limits 0/ Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN, L. REv. 2100 (2009). 
According to Justice Antonin Scalia, who spoke recently at Hawaii's Richardson School of Law, that may 
change. 
104. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
105. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984). 
106. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 at 469. 
107. See generally id. Justice Thomas' dissent included a lengthy historical analysis, which suggests he 
would have the Court return to the original meaning of the eighteenth century in which most eminent domain 
cases appear to require actual use by the public. Id. at 506-14 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens reads 
some of the same history quite differently by choosing other cases from that period upon which to rely-which 
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Thomas) agree that the most relevant precedents are the decisions of the Court 
in Berman and Midkiff. In both decisions, the Court wrote expansively about 
the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 
In Berman, the Court dealt with the condemnation of a thriving 
department store contained in a large parcel condemned by a redevelopment 
agency for the statutory (congressional in this case) purpose of eliminating 
blight, all in accordance with a required redevelopment plan. 108 Justice 
Douglas for the majority commenced by observing famously that a community 
could decide to be attractive as well as safe, and that, in thus justifying eminent 
domain to accomplish these goals, "[ w]e deal, in other words, with what 
traditionally been known as the police power," a controversial joining of the 
two powers that has affected definitions of public use ever since by obviating 
any need for the public to actually use the property condemned so long as it 
furthered a public purpose. I 09 The landowners pointed out that their land would 
simply be turned over to another private owner. I 10 No matter, said Douglas: 
But the means of executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to 
determine, once the public purpose has been established. The public end may be 
as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a 
department of govemment-or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say 
that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of 
community redevelopment projects. I I I 
To the landowners' argument that their particular parcel was unblighted, 
and that therefore its condemnation violated the Fifth Amendment's Public Use 
Clause, Justice Douglas responded that if experts concluded the area must be 
planned as a whole in order to prevent reversion to a slum, so be it. 112 Despite 
this broad language, many interpreted the decision to apply largely to 
redevelopment projects, and in particular, those that were well-planned in 
accordance with clear statutory mandates. Not so after Midkiff. 
In 1967, the Hawaii State Legislature passed a land reform act, the 
principal purpose of which was to eliminate a perceived oligopoly in available 
residential land which was thought to adversely affect the price and availability 
of housing for its citizens. I 13 Eminent domain was the means chosen to solve 
the problem. The act authorized a state agency-the Hawaii Housing 
Authority-to condemn the fee simple interest in land, which was leased to 
individual homeowners, for the purpose of conveying that interest to some other 
private owner, usually the existing owner's lessee who owned the house on the 
land. 114 The main target of the legislation was the Bishop Estate (as it was then 
Justice O'Connor also uses in her dissent. Id. at 472-90; id. at 494-505 (O'Connor, 1., dissenting). 
108. Berman, 348 U.S. at 30-31. 
109. !d. at 32. 
110. Id. at 31. 
III. !d. at 33-34. 
112. Id. at 34-35. 
113. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1984). 
114. Id. at 233. 
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known), a charitable trust created by Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, a 
descendent of King Kamehameha the Great and whose large landholdings she 
eventually inherited. The Estate challenged the Act's condemnation process as 
a taking without the public use required by the U.S. Constitution's Fifth 
Arnendment. lls While the Federal District Court upheld the statute, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statute essentially provided for a "naked" 
transfer from one private individual to another, and therefore lacked the 
requisite public use. 116 
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit, citing Berman for the proposition that once a legislative body had 
declared a public purpose, it was not for federal courts to interfere unless that 
purpose was "inconceivable" or an "impossibility." 117 The means were 
irrelevant; this was simply a mechanism or process to accomplish the 
legislatively declared public purpose. Indeed, it would make no difference, said 
Justice O'Connor writing for the Court, if that public purpose never came to 
pass, so long as the legislature could reasonably have thought it would when 
enacting the statute. I 18 Note the opinion frequently uses "public purpose" 
rather than "public use." These words would come back to haunt Justice 
O'Connor in Kelo, as appears below. 
C. Kelo v. City of New London: Midkiff, Berman and a Requiem for Public 
Use 
The Court in Kelo simply extended the reasoning in Berman and Midkiff 
to the economic revitalization condemnations that are increasingly common 
throughout urban areas in the United States. Indeed, the majority was 
singularly unimpressed with extreme uses of eminent domain for the purposes 
of providing employment and bettering the local tax base as the parties brought 
to its attention: "A parade ofhorribles is especially unpersuasive in this context 
since the Takings Clause largely 'operates as a conditional limitation permitting 
the government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.' "119 
The facts in Keto are straightforward. In order to take advantage of a 
substantial private investment in new facilities by Pfizer, Inc., in an 
economically depressed area of New London along the Thames River, the City 
reactivated the private non-profit New London Development Corporation 
("NLDC") to assist in planning the area's economic development. 120 
115. Id. at 234-35. 
116. Id. at 235. 
117. Id. at 239-40. 
118. Id. at 244. 
119. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, n.19 (2005) (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 
545 (1998». There are numerous examples of such "horribles." See Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private 
Gain (2003), available at http://castJecoalition.org/pdfJreportlEDJeport.pdf. 
120. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473-74. 
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Authorized and aided by grants totaling millions of dollars, NLDC held 
meetings and eventually "finalized an integrated development plan focused on 
[ninety] acres of the Fort Trumbull area.,,121 The NLDC successfully 
negotiated the purchase of most of the real estate in the ninety-acre area, but its 
negotiations with the owners of fifteen properties failed. 122 When the NLDC 
initiated condemnation proceedings, the landowners sued. 123 Among them was 
Susette Keto, who had lived in the Fort Trumbull area since 1997,124 and who 
made extensive improvements to her house, which she prized for its water 
view. 125 There was also Wilhelmina Dery, who was born in her Fort Trumbull 
house in 1918 and had lived there her entire life. 126 Although there was no 
allegation that any of these properties were blighted or otherwise in poor 
condition, they were nevertheless condemned with the others "because they 
happen to be located in the development area."127 
On these facts, petitioners claimed that the taking of their property 
violated the public use restriction in the Fifth Amendment. 128 A trial court 
agreed as to the parcel containing the Kelo house, but a divided Supreme Court 
of Connecticut reversed, holding that all of the City's proposed takings were 
constitutional. I29 Noting that the proposed takings were authorized by the 
state's municipal development statute and in particular the taking of even 
developed land as part of an economic development project was for a public 
use and in the public interest, the court relied on Berman and MidkifJin holding 
that such economic development qualified as a public use under both federal 
and state constitutions. 130 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "to 
determine whether a city's decision to take property for the purpose of 
economic development satisfies the 'public use' requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment." 131 
The Court's answer: an unequivocal yes. While the Court noted that the 
state may "not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to 
another private party B ... it is equally clear that a State may transfer property 
from one private party to another if future 'use by the public' is the purpose of 
the taking.,,132 The question, then, is what constitutes sufficient use by the 
121. [d. 
122. [d. at 475. 
123. ld. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. However, it now seems that some of the condemned parcels owned by plaintiffs were in fact in 
the path of proposed new streets and roads-which, of course, would have always qualified them for public 
purpose takings. See George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo: What's Blight Got To Do With It?, 
17 S. CAL. REv. L. & SOC. JUST. 803, 808 (2008). 
126. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 at 475. 
127. ld. 
128. [d. 
129. See id. at 476. 
130. [d. at 476-77. 
131. [d. at 477. 
132. ld. 
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public. Three factors appear to be important in reaching the conclusion that 
economic revitalization in New London constitutes such use: a rigorous 
planning process, the Court's precedents embodied in Berman and Midkiff, and 
deference to federalism and state decision making. 
The Court commenced its analysis by reiterating that private-private 
transfers alone are unconstitutional and any pretextual public purposes meant 
solely to accomplish such transfers would fail the public use test. 133 However, 
the Court observed that the governmental taking before it was meant to 
"revitalize the local economy by creating temporary and permanent jobs, 
generating a significant increase in tax revenue, encouraging spin-off economic 
activities and maximizing public access to the waterfront" I 34 all in accordance 
with a "carefully considered"135 and "carefully formulated,,136 development 
plan in accordance with a state statute "that specifically authorizes the use of 
eminent domain to promote economic development.,,137 Therefore, the "record 
clearly demonstrates that the development plan was not intended to serve the 
interests of Pfizer, Inc., or any other private entity."138 Indeed, the Court was 
particularly impressed by "the comprehensive character of the plan [and] the 
thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption.,,139 Although little in the plan 
demonstrated any actual use by the public, the Court observed that it had 
embraced a broader and more "natural" interpretation of public use as public 
purpose at least since the end of the nineteenth century and "we have repeatedly 
and consistently rejected that narrow [use by the public] test ever since." 140 
Next, the Court observed that this broad definition of public use accorded 
with its "longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this 
field.,,141 The Court then discussed its decisions in Berman and Midkiff as 
demonstrations of such legislative deference, quoting heavily from the 
language in Berman about "the power of the legislature to determine that the 
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, 
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."142 The Court concluded that its 
"jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in 
favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs 
justify the use of the takings power." I 43 
133. Id. at 490. 
134. Id. at 478 n.6. 
135. Id. at 478. 
136. Id. at 483. 
137. Id. at 484. 
138. Id. at 478, n.6. 
139. Id. at 484. While widely touted as a victory for planning and planners, at least one commentator 
thinks not. See Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo Is Not Good News For Local Planners and Developers, 22 GA. ST. 
U. L. REv. 803, 811-12 (2006). 
140. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 at 480. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 481 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)). 
143. Id. at 483. 
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The Court rejected any suggestion that it formulate a more rigorous 
test. 144 Thus, for example, to require the government to show that public 
benefits would actually accrue with reasonable certainty or that the 
implementation of a development plan would actually occur would take the 
Court into factual inquiries already rejected earlier in the term when the Court 
rejected the "substantially advances a legitimate state interest" test for 
regulatory takings in Lingle. 145 Similarly, the Court declined to second-guess 
the city's determinations as to what lands it needed to acquire in order to 
facilitate the project. 146 
Lastly, the Court rejected the invitation by some amici to deal with the 
appropriateness of compensation under the circumstances. While the Court 
acknowledged the hardships which the condemnations might entail in this case, 
"these questions are not before us in this litigation" even though members of 
the Court itself raised the adequacy of compensation during oral argument. 147 
In a nod to federalism and states' rights, the Court closed by leaving to the states 
any remedy for such hardships posed by the condemnations in New London: 
"We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing 
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many states 
already impose 'public use' requirements that are stricter than the federal 
baseline." 148 
There was very little left of the Public Use Clause-at least in federal 
court--even before the Kelo decision. While a growing handful of state (and 
federal decisions applying state law on property) decisions found economic 
revitalization public purposes invalid on constitutional grounds,149 an equal 
number of decisions agreed with the Connecticut Supreme Court that this was 
a valid public use. Clearly this is the view of hundreds of state and local 
revitalization and redevelopment agencies. I50 Whether one reads the Court's 
previous jurisprudence on public use broadly, as Justice Stevens does for the 
Court's majority, or more narrowly, as does the dissent, it is difficult to argue 
with the conclusions reached separately by Justices O'Connor and Thomas: the 
Public Use Clause is virtually eliminated in federal court. What yellow light of 
144. ld. at 487-88. 
145. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 528 (2005). 
146. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488-89. 
147. ld. at 490 n.21. Other countries provide a measure of extra compensation where, as here, it is a 
private residence which is condemned and the landowner has a demonstrable emotional attachment to the 
improved land. See, e.g., the Australian concept of solatium, amounting to up to ten percent additional 
compensation beyond fair market value in such circumstances, briefly noted (among other compensation 
issues). See Adam Mossoff, The Death o/Poletown: The Future a/Eminent Domain and Urban Development 
After County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 837, 841 (2004); see also Kotaka and Callies (ed) 
TAKING LAND: COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND LAND USE REGULATION IN ASIAN,PACIFIC COUNTRIES 27-74 
(Tsuyoshi Kotaka & David L. Callies eds., 2002). 
148. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 at 489. 
149. See Mossoff, supra note 147 at 3; Sw. III. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d I, II (III. 
2001). 
150. See Berliner, supra note 119 at 18. 
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caution the handful of recent cases signaled has now turned back to green, and 
government may once more acquire private property by eminent domain on the 
slightest of public purpose pretexts unless such a use is inconceivable or 
involves an impossibility, as in the tests following Midkiff in 1984. In other 
words, it's now all about process, and process only. There is no doubt that state 
and local governments will do much good in terms of public welfare and public 
benefits flowing from economic revitalization under such a relaxed standard, 
as they have often done in the past. They will do so with increased attention to 
carefully drafted plans and procedures guaranteeing maximum public exposure 
and participation, both emphasized in the majority opinion. Moreover, 
members of the Court during oral argument suggested rethinking how to 
calculate and award "just" compensation in extenuating circumstances such as 
those in Kelo now that the Public Use Clause is a mere procedural hurdle. 151 
Only Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggests some small role yet for 
federal courts in determining that a particular exercise of eminent domain might 
fall short of the required public use requirement: "There may be private 
transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private 
parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is 
warranted under the Public Use Clause."152 In other words, if the taking is 
"pretextual," it will fail the public fee or purpose test. This is, however, largely 
a due process argument rather than a Fifth Amendment argument, and in any 
event, continued Kennedy: "This demanding level of scrutiny, however, is not 
required simply because the purpose of the taking is economic 
development." 153 
Pretextuality became the basis of a successful appeal in Hawaii. The 
County of Hawaii sought to condemn property owned by C&J Coupe Family 
Limited Partnership to build a public highway bypass. 154 The bypass was to 
alleviate traffic conditions caused by the Oceanside Partners' development of 
the Hokuli'a subdivision. 155 Oceanside entered a development agreement with 
the County to construct the bypass,156 where upon completing the bypass, 
Oceanside would dedicate it to the County. 157 The County would then assume 
responsibility for the bypass. 158 The Coupe family, which owned land through 
151. There is commentary on both sides of the national debate on the decision. See generally, Daniel H. 
Cole, Kelo's Legacy, 37 E.L.R. 10540 (2007); Michael M. Berger, Court Goes "Clueless ": Now Public Use 
Means Whatever!, MANATI , PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP (June 30, 2005), http://www.manatt.comlWhite-
Papers/Court-Goes-Clueless-Now-Public-Use-Means-Whatever.aspx; John R. Nolon and Jessica 
A. Bacher, Fallout from Kelo, N.Y. L.J.(2005). For a full treatment of the issues raised by the Kelo decision, 
see EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT (Dwight H. Merriam & Mary Massaron Ross eds., 
2006). 
152. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
153. Id. 
154. Cnty. of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family, 198 P.3d 615, 620 (Haw. 2008). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 621. 
158. Id. 
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which the bypass would pass, refused to sell the strip of land required for part 
of its construction, then objected to the condemnation of the strip on the ground 
that the road would serve to connect other oceanside property to a public road, 
and so it was "pretextual," even though the public would make use of the bypass 
to alleviate traffic congestion. 
In addressing whether the government's stated public purpose was 
pretextual, the Court relied on Kelo. 159 The court stated that the Kelo majority 
opinion, being consistent with its prior decisions, "allows courts to look behind 
an eminent domain plaintiffs asserted public purpose under certain 
circumstances."160 The court further explained that Justice Stevens's opinion 
was informative because this case, like Kelo, involved the transfer of 
condemned property from one private party to another. 161 
The court concluded that the public purpose of the bypass was evident 
from its nature as a public road. 162 The court provided, based on its precedents 
and Kelo, that: 
it appears that the stated public purpose in this case ... comports with the public 
use requirements of both the Hawai'i and United States constitutions. The Keto 
decision confirms that the fact that the condemned property is transferred from 
one private owner to another does not ... invalidate the taking. 163 
Other recent physical takings cases raise the odd use issue. Thus, the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently decided a case involving the temporary flooding of 
state woodland preserves by the U.S. as part of a flood control project which 
resulted in the damaging of large areas of state forest. 164 Among the issues 
which could have been decided is whether the Fifth Amendment applies if one 
government damages by inverse condemnation land owned by another 
government, since the Fifth Amendment provides on its face a shield against 
the taking of private property, and says nothing about public property. The 
Court simply held that such a temporary flooding could be a taking and 
remanded the case back to the lower court to decide if in fact there had been a 
taking in this instance. The government's position, which the Court rejected, 
is that such temporary flooding could never be a constitutionally-protected 
taking. 
Is avoiding severance litigation a "public use" sufficient to satisfy the Fifth 
Amendment? In Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT') v. Carlson, 165 
the Supreme Court of Utah presided over an action brought by a property owner 
challenging the agency's condemnation of two adjoining parcels totaling fifteen 
acres when only 1.2 acres was required for the project. The landowner objected 
159. Id. at 638. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 639. 
162. /d. at 643. 
163. Id. 
164. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012). 
165. 332 P.3d 900 (Utah 2014). 
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to the excessive condemnation on the grounds that (1) the UDOT lacked the 
statutory authority to do so and (2) UDOT lacked a legitimate public use in 
taking the excess property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
The court dismissed Carlson's statutory authority claim, rejecting the 
argument that the agency's power to exercise eminent domain is limited to the 
public uses specifically enumerated in the statute. However, the court 
remanded the case on Carlson's public use argument, framing the issue as 
"whether UDOT's condemnation of excess property satisfies the 'public use' 
element of the federal and state constitutions."166 The court found remand 
necessary to develop a more complete record on the issue, noting that the 
question of public use is far from settled at both the state and federal level. The 
court also pointed out that, although Utah's statute permitted the taking of 
property in excess of what is needed, there "is a lack of any clearly articulated 
'public use' proffered byUDOT on the record before us."167 
IV. REGULATORY TAKINGS 
The concept of regulatory taking is deceptively simple: if a land use or 
environmental regulation goes too far, it may result in so limiting the use ofthe 
relevant parcel or other interest in private property that a constitutionally-
protected taking results. 168 After stating the regulatory taking doctrine in 1923, 
the U.S. Supreme Court did not again address the issue in any meaningful sense 
for half a century, leading many commentators and most state courts to regard 
the issue as having faded into insignificance. However, in a series of cases 
decided in the last quarter of this past century, the Court recognized and set out 
tests for determining partial regulatory takings, total or categorical regulatory 
takings, and at what point such disputes about regulatory takings are "ripe" for 
decision. 
A. Categorical "Total" Takings 
A land use regulation totally takes property when it leaves the landowner 
without "economically beneficial use" of land. The land may still have value. 
It may even have some limited "salvage" uses, such as for walking or 
picnicking. But if no economically beneficial use remains, then the government 
must pay for the land as if it had condemned it, or lift the offending regulation 
and potentially pay for the time during which the unconstitutional regulation 
affected the use of the land. These are the rules of First English Evangelical 
166. Id. at 906. 
167. Id. at 907. 
168. See generally Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); and, for extensive comment, see supra 
Benson at 5; Bosselman, Callies and Banta, The Taking Issue (1973) and ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS 
ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1999). 
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Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles 1 69 and Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council. But it is a rare case in which a landowner can 
demonstrate that a regulation has deprived the subject property of all 
economically beneficial use. 
In practice, it is very difficult for landowners to successfully pursue 
categorical taking claims. The hurdle that landowners face in demonstrating a 
total taking is illustrated by the fact that appellate courts have frequently 
reversed trial courts that applied the Lucas "denial of economically beneficial 
use" test. These appellate courts often hold that a partial taking analysis under 
Penn Central is more appropriate. 170 
In Collins v. Monroe County,171 a Florida appellate court reversed a trial 
court that found multiple "facial" takings under Lucas 1 72 when property owners 
subject to the County's new Comprehensive Plan successfully obtained 
,Beneficial Use Determinations ("BUDs") from the Board of County 
Commissioners that declared their properties unbuildable. After declaring the 
taking claim at issue to be an "as-applied" challenge under Penn Central, the 
court held that, while the BUDs functioned as final determinations from the 
County to satisfy ripeness requirements under Williamson County Regional 
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 173 they did not suffice 
to determine whether the properties were actually deprived of all economically 
beneficial use, which the court suggested was far from apparent. Instead, the 
case was remanded for application of the Penn Central test. 
Distinguishing "facial" from "as-applied" regulatory taking claims was 
likewise an issue in Shands v. City of Marathon, 174 where the same Florida 
appellate court again reversed a trial court's choice of Lucas over Penn Central. 
The Court noted that the transferrable development rights available under the 
City'S Comprehensive Plan, as well as the opportunity to apply for a variance 
for a single-family home, defeated any claim that the city's designation of 
plaintiffs 7.9 acres in the Florida Keys as a conservation zone had deprived the 
property of all economically beneficial use. 
In Cummins v. Robinson Township,175 an appellate court in Michigan 
reversed the decision below because the trial court had incorrectly applied 
Lucas instead of Penn Central when considering a case in which the Township 
had required property owners to employ flood-resistant construction in 
rebuilding several homes destroyed by a flood in a flood zone. Plaintiffs argued 
169. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
170. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (I 978} (stating the partial 
taking analysis). 
171. 999 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
172. Id. at 711 (explaining that Lucas applied to "facial" takings, whereas Penn Central applied to "as 
applied" challenges). 
173. 473 U.S. 172 (l985). 
174. 999 So. 2d 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
175. 770 N.W.2d 421 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). 
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that they suffered a categorical taking under Lucas because the Township 
required them "to either abandon their home or rebuild it at costs far exceeding 
its value, which essentially deprived them of all its economically beneficial 
use.,,176 The court disagreed, holding that "[t]he Takings Clause does not 
guarantee property owners an economic profit from the use of their land."I77 
Using the same basic rationale, the Court of Federal Claims in McGuire 
v. United States 178 found the application of a total regulatory taking test 
inappropriate and remanded for the case to proceed under Penn Central after 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs demolished a bridge linking two portions of 
property leased by a farmer from the Colorado River Indian Tribes. The 
Plaintiff claimed inverse condemnation, alleging that the "removal of the bridge 
caused his lease to have a negative market value because the southern portion 
was destined to fail to generate enough crop and resulting income to make the 
lease payment." 179 Strictly applying the Lucas rule, the court asserted that "[ a] 
total deprivation of 'all economically beneficial or productive use[]' of a 
property must occur.,,180 The fact that the plaintiff might be upside-down on 
his lease was insufficient. 
Recall that Justice Scalia's majority opinion repeatedly stressed land use, 
not land value, as the measure of a categorical taking, expressly equating 
"sacrifice all economically beneficial uses" to "leav[ing] . . . property 
economically idle."181 That the land retains some market value or that non-
economic, "salvage" uses still exist is extraneous to the analysis. 182 
As McGuire v. United States demonstrates, courts have set a high bar for 
plaintiffs who seek to demonstrate that their property has been deprived of all 
economically beneficial use. A Texas appellate court, in Walton v. City of 
Midland,183 affirmed a trial court's rejection of the argument that a categorical 
per se taking had occurred when the City granted a drilling permit to the lessee 
of the oil and gas rights beneath the plaintiffs property. In addition to holding 
that the City merely gave the lessee permission to do what the title allowed, the 
court-arguably in conflict with Lucas's emphasis on use over value-
concluded that the plaintiff had not stated a viable claim because: 
evidence indicated that his property had a value of at least $3,000 per acre after 
[the lessee] drilled the well. Accordingly, the granting of the pennit did not 
176. Id. at 443. 
177. Id. at 448 (citing Paragen Props. Co. v. City of No vi, 550 N.W.2d 772, 776 n.13 (Mich. 1996». 
178. 97 Fed. Cl. 425 (2011). 
179. Id. at 440. 
180. Id. 
181. Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (emphasis in original). 
182. See David L. Callies, Takings: An Introduction and Overview, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 441,446 (2002). 
"[T)he fact that someone, such as the government or an environmental group, may be willing to pay for land 
that can only be 'used' in its natural state does not necessarily means that the 'use' ofleaving the property in 
its natural state is an 'economically viable' one." Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning 
Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1243 (D. Nev. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 216 F.3d 764 (2000), affd, 535 
U.S. 302 (2002). 
183. 409 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. App. 2013), review denied (Jan. 3, 2014). 
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deprive him of all economically beneficial use of the property to the extent that 
he was only left with a token interest. 184 
More recently, in Scot Netherlands, Inc. v. State Department of 
Environmental Protection,185 a New Jersey appellate court affirmed a trial 
court in finding that the state's denial ofa landowner's application for a wetland 
fill permit did not constitute a categorical taking. The court held that the 
landowner, although barred from developing twenty-two acres of property in 
Atlantic City, enjoyed an economically beneficial use of the property because 
he collected rent from an existing billboard. 
However, the Lucas test is not entirely without teeth. Courts in a handful 
of cases are occasionally willing to find that a government action amounts to a 
categorical taking. In Resource Investments, Inc. v. United States, 186 the Court 
of Federal Claims confronted the issue of "whether applying Lucas to plaintiffs' 
temporary regulatory takings claim would violate Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency and the 'parcel as a whole' rule.,,187 
Plaintiffs owned and leased a large parcel that, due to its hydrogeology, was 
well-suited to landfill use and little else. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
("COE") denied a dredge and fill permit allegedly required because wetlands 
had been discovered on the property. Distinguishing Tahoe-Sierra, the court 
noted that the regulation was not expressly temporally limited, but rather 
prospectively permanent; therefore, there was no severance of the parcel into 
temporal slices. Moreover, unlike in First English, the resolution of the 
temporary taking in this case was the result of a Ninth Circuit decision that 
found the COE had exercised improper jurisdiction over the site, not because 
the government had withdrawn the regulations. As the court put it: 
that plaintiffs eventually regained economically viable use of their property is not 
ipso facto fatal to their categorical takings claim. But in order to determine 
whether the denial effected a categorical taking as a matter oflaw, this court must 
now inquire whether plaintiffs lacked any economically viable use of their 
property after the Corps denied plaintiffs' permit. 188 
Ultimately, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on 
their Lucas claim, but only for lack of proof of causation, which the court 
suggested could be demonstrated in further proceedings. 
In Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States I 89 (on remand from the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) the Court of Federal Claims found that the 
COE had deprived a property of all economically beneficial use by denying the 
184. Id. at 932. 
185. No. A-5156-11T3, 2014 WL 1343871 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 7, 2014). 
186. 85 Fed. Cl. 447 (2009). 
187. Id. at 469 (citing 535 u.s. 302 (2002)). In Tahoe-Sierra, the court held that temporary regulations 
that deprive property of all economically viable use are to be analyzed under Penn Central, not Lucas, because 
the deprivation is only to a temporal segment of the parcel. Tahoe-Sierra. 535 U.S. at 331. 
188. Resource Invs .. Inc., 85 Fed. Cl. at 485. 
189. 115 Fed. Cl. 219 (2014). 
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landowner's application for a wetland fill permit. 190 Although the court 
arguably confused "land use" with "land value," it rejected the government's 
attempt to define the economic value lost as the difference between the value 
of the property the moment before the permit was denied ("thus encompassing 
the uncertainty of whether a permit would be granted"), and the value of the 
property without a permit. 191 Instead, the court determined the economic loss 
by considering the difference between the property's fair market value at its 
"highest and best use," and the property's value following the permit denial. 192 
Accordingly, the court found that the permit denial constituted a categorical 
taking under Lucas because the property had suffered a diminution in value of 
99.4%. 
1. The Lucas Exceptions 
The U.S. Supreme Court set out two exceptions to its categorical rule-
situations in which the proscribed use interests would not be a part of the 
owner's title to begin with: nuisance and background principles of a state's law 
of property. 193 The exceptions provide the only safe haven for state and local 
government when a land use regulation takes all economically beneficial use 
from a parcel of land. Although recent appellate opinions have addressed 
relatively few takings cases that have turned primarily on nuisance abatement 
as a defense, background principles---chiefly, variations of the public trust 
doctrine and, to a lesser extent, customary law-have seen increasing action 
and, in some jurisdictions, considerable extension. 194 Ironically, whereas 
Lucas has generally been viewed as a victory for property rights, the courts 
have tended to construe the "denial of economically beneficial use" test very 
narrowly, while deployment of "the background principles defense has proved 
to be a fertile ground for government defendants."195 
a. The Nuisance Exception 
If the law of the jurisdiction would allow neighbors or the state to prohibit 
190. /d. at 220. 
191. Id. at 229. "The government may not lower the fair market value of Plat 57 by relying on the 
possibility of the very taking at issue." Id. at 230. 
192. Id. at 231 ("[M)eaning with a section 404 pennit or absent the regulatory scheme entirely."). 
193. For an earlier look at the subject, see David L. Callies, Nuisance and Background Principles: The 
Lucas Exceptions, SJ052 ALI-ABA 473 (Apr. 22-24, 2004). 
194. The growing importance and application of the public trust doctrine is reflected by the recent 
publication of the first casebook dedicated to it. See generally MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY C. WOOD, THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE LAW (2013). Because of the public 
trust doctrine's "remarkable" evolution and recent development as a "burgeoning area of the law," Professor 
Blumm notes that it "remains ... largely mysterious." Michael C. Biumm, The Public Trust Doctrine-A 
Twenty-First Century Concept, 16 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVT'L. L. & POL'y lOS, 107-09 (2010). For a 
thorough investigation of the nuisance exception, see Professor Carol Nicole Brown's excellent and thought-
provoking analysis at 30 TOURO L. REv. 349 (2014). 
195. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles 
as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 321, 341 (2005). 
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the proposed uses ofland because they would constitute either public or private 
nuisances, then government can prohibit them by regulation without providing 
compensation. This is because nuisances are always unlawful and are never 
part of a landowner's title to begin with, so prohibiting them does not deprive 
a landowner of a property right. The Court in Lucas gave as examples laws 
that would prevent the construction of a nuclear power plant on an earthquake 
fault line, or the filling of lake front land so as to raise the water level and flood 
neighboring land. 196 
Courts have generally applied most nuisance exceptions in mining 
cases 197 and actions involving the demolition of private structures that do not 
meet housing codes. 198 However, at least one (sharply divided) court has 
upheld the denial of a permit to construct a marina even if the owner were left 
with no economically beneficial use, on the ground that the additional traffic 
generated would constitute a nuisance, and therefore represent an exception to 
the categorical rule. 199 An Arizona appellate court affirmed summary 
judgment in favor of the City of Phoenix when the City closed a "swingers' 
club" featuring live sex acts because the "business clearly fell within the type 
of conduct that could have been abated at common law as a public health 
hazard[,]" although the court corrected the trial court's erroneous use of Penn 
Central instead of Lucas as the relevant takings test.200 
The Florida Supreme Court has also extended "nuisance exception" status 
to the closing of a motel used for prostitution and drug dealing, although not to 
the closing of an apartment used occasionally for drug transactions, in Keshbro, 
Inc. v. City of Miami.201 To the same effect, a federal district court recently 
dismissed a facial challenge to a Florida ordinance that authorized year-long 
closures of properties that were used for the sale of drugs, finding that the 
ordinance was constitutional under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
because "[aJ person has no legitimate property right in a nuisance, and the City 
need not compensate when a nuisance is ordered abated."202 However, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio arrived at the opposite conclusion in State v. 
196. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
197. See, e.g., Rith Energy, Inc. v United States, 44 Fed. CI. 366 (Fed. CI. 1999); Machipongo Land & 
Coal Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002) (holding that the danger to public waterways from 
mining pollution constituted a public nuisance); Kinross Copper Corp. v. Oregon, 98 P .2d 833 (Or. App. 200 I). 
But see Placer Mining Co. v. United States, 98 Fed. CI. 681 (2011) (noting that the rule that "a landowner has 
no right to maintain a nuisance on his property ... is based on a rule derived from regulatory takings cases, 
particularly Lucas" while "the rule's applicability to physical takings is far from settled"). 
198. See generally Embassy Realty Jnvs., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, No. 4300, 2014 WL 3376900 (6th 
Cir. July 10,2014); Amaya v. City of San Antonio, No. 00574,2014 WL 3050071 (W.O. Tex. July 3, 2014; 
City of Bryan/Bldg. & Standards Comm'n v. Cavitt, No. 00259, 2014 WL 1882765 (Tex. App. May 8, 2014); 
Sheikh v. City of Deltona, No. 1526,2014 WL 1345396 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2014); DuffY v. Mange, CV 11-\3-
SLR-SRF, 2014 WL 573359 (D. Del. Feb. II, 2014) (report and recommendation adopted, CV 11-13-
SLRlSRF, 2014 WL 975120 (D. Del. Mar. 10,2014). 
199. Windward Marina, L.L.C. v City of Destin, 743 So.2d 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
200. Mutschler v. City of Phoenix, 129 P.3d 71,77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). 
201. 801 So. 2d 864, 874 (Fla. 2001). 
202. Abu-Khadier v. City of Fort Myers, No. 00387, 2014 WL 3446416, at "5 (M.D. Fla. July 15,2014). 
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Rezcallah,203 and held that the padlocking of property for one year as a result 
of drug activity was not a nuisance exception and not substantially advancing a 
legitimate state interest in curtailing the use and sales of drugs. 
Some courts have recognized the potential for government abuse of the 
nuisance exception. In Noell v. City ofCarrollton,204 a Texas Appellate Court 
considered a due process claim arising from the City of Carrollton's declaration 
that a private airport was a nuisance, an act that closed the airport and destroyed 
easements held by shareholders. The Court held that although a city: 
has the power to abate nuisances, it does not have the power to declare or define 
them, at least to the extent it seeks to utilize a nuisance determination to destroy 
property rights. In other words, the State may not by declaration transform 
private property into public property under the police power.205 
Similarly, the nuisance abatement defense to inverse condemnation failed 
in Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v. Bogor.ff.206 In Bogorff, 
a class-action involving roughly 50,000 plaintiffs, a Florida appellate court 
affirmed the trial court's finding that the Department of Agriculture had taken 
over 100,000 healthy citrus trees when it destroyed them as part of a citrus 
canker eradication program. The Department claimed that the trees, likely 
already exposed to the disease, would have eventually fallen victim to the 
canker, and thus were valueless. The only way to stop the canker, argued the 
Department, was to destroy the trees. The court found those contentions both 
pretextual and illogical, stating: 
It is apparent ... that [the Department] destroyed these privately owned healthy 
trees not because they were really "imminently dangerous" to anybody but 
instead to benefit the citrus industry in Florida .... To be a public nuisance, 
property must cause "inconvenience or damage to the public generally." If trees 
are destroyed not to prevent harm but instead to benefit an industry, it is difficult 
to understand how [the Department] can argue on appeal that the trees legally 
constituted a nuisance without any value. Property with any value cannot be 
deemed a nuisance, the nature of which perforce lacks that redeeming quality.207 
Again, in Cebe Farms, Inc. v. United States,208 the Court of Federal 
Claims held that the government must establish, not simply declare, the 
presence of a nuisance in order to utilize the nuisance exception. In Cebe, the 
United States Department of Agriculture raised the nuisance abatement defense 
to an inverse condemnation claim that plaintiffs brought after the Department 
destroyed their unique chicken breeds during an outbreak of Exotic Newcastle 
Disease ("END") in Southern California. The Department moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that the government did not owe compensation because it 
destroyed the diseased chicken flocks pursuant to its power to abate nuisances. 
203. 702 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio 1998). 
204. 431 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014). 
205. ld. at 697. 
206. 35 So.3d 84 (Fla. App. 20 JO). 
207. Id. at 89. 
208. 116 Fed. Cl. 179 (2014). 
76 Washburn Law Journal [Vol. 54 
The court held that the Department could not rely on the nuisance abatement 
defense without first definitively establishing that Cebe Farms' chicken flocks 
were actually infected with END. The court declared that it would not allow 
the Department to circumvent the Fifth Amendment "by resorting to the 
circular logic that by conceding the legality of the government's action in order 
to maintain a takings claim, plaintiff must also concede that the government 
was correct in all of it's determinations.''209 
In Bailey v. United States,210 the Court of Federal Claims again interpreted 
the nuisance exception narrowly. The plaintiff, seeking to residentially develop 
his lakefront wetland property, was denied two permits, one by the state of 
Minnesota, and one by the COE. The state denied the first permit based on the 
finding that the "ISTS" sewer system proposed by the plaintiffwould constitute 
a nuisance under state law. Meanwhile, the COE denied the second permit on 
the grounds that any construction on the property would irreparably damage the 
wetland environment-a denial that effectively prevented the plaintiff from 
pursuing any residential development on the lakefront. In the ensuing inverse 
condemnation action, the United States moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that the COE's permit denial did not constitute a taking because the proposed 
development had already been declared a nuisance under Minnesota law by the 
state's denial of the first permit. Thus, the United States argued, "neither 
plaintiff, nor any other owner, could possess a stick in their bundle of property 
rights that would allow them to locate residential development on the lake front 
lots at issue in this case. ,,211 The court disagreed, stating: 
[t]his evidence establishes that plaintiff is prohibited by Minnesota's background 
principles of nuisance law from developing Sunny Beach into residential lots 
using the proposed plan and using a mound ISTS. But it is far from clear that 
plaintiff has no right under Minnesota law to develop Sunny Beach into 
residentiallots.212 
b. The Background Principles Exception 
As with nuisance, if a regulation were consistent with a background 
principle of a state's law of property, again there would be no deprivation of a 
cognizable right in property. While the Court in Lucas gave no examples of a 
background principle, customary rights and land held subject to public trust are 
emerging as such background principles in several jurisdictions-and, 
occasionally, an old statute.213 
209. Id. at 201. 
210. 116 Fed. Cl. 310 (2014). 
211. Id.at318. 
212. Id.at321. 
213. David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in Takings Law: Background 
Principles, Custom and Public Trust "Exceptions" and the (Mis)Use of Investment-Backed Expectations, 36 
VAL. U. L. REV. 339 (2002). 
2014] Through a Glass Clearly 77 
i. The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principle 
Broadly stated, the public trust doctrine provides that a state holds public 
trust lands, waters, and living resources in trust for the benefit of its citizens, 
establishing the right of the public to fully enjoy them for a variety of uses and 
purposes.214 Implied in this definition are limitations on the private use of 
waters and lands that are impressed with the public trust, as well as limitations 
on how the state may transfer interests in such land and water, particularly if 
the transfer will prevent public use. These definitions and duties analytically 
flow from the dual nature of title in public trust lands and water. On the one 
hand, the public has the right to use and enjoy the land and water-the res of 
the public trust-for such activities as commerce, navigation, fishing, bathing, 
and related public purposes. This is the so-called jus publicum. On the other 
hand, since one-third of public trust property is reportedly in private hands 
rather than public,215 private property rights coexist with public rights in much 
land and water subject to the public trust doctrine-the jus privatum.216 
The issue, of course, is the extent to which the public trust doctrine can 
legally eliminate private property rights without the compensation required by 
the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment. To the extent that public trust rights 
are recognized, they constitute a diminution of the fee simple, much like the 
recognized private limitations on fee simple such as leaseholds, easements, and 
the burdens of covenants running with the land. These are interests held by 
strangers to the basic title of the landowner, and are therefore not "part of his 
title to begin with." In the same fashion, if public trust rights are valid, then 
these also represent interests in private land that are not part of the owner's title 
to begin with-a valid background principle of property law that is an exception 
to the per se categorical regulatory takings rule. 
The issue of regulatory taking in connection with public trust arises most 
frequently when a state court or legislature "reaffirms" the public's trust 
"rights" on private property. This occurs when a state: (1) imposes restrictions 
on privately-held trust lands; (2) requires public access across private land or 
access to trust lands or water; or (3) expands the scope of public activities 
permitted under the guise of public trust rights. Most public trust lands are 
submerged, tidal, or water-flowed. However, some courts expand the 
application of public trust doctrine to "dry-sand" and other more useable and 
214. DAVID SLADE, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 4 (Coastal States Organization, 2d 
ed., 1990); see generally, George P. Smith & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural 
Law: Emanations Within A Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 307 (2006). For a thorough review of the 
states' many manifestations of the public trust doctrine, see Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the 
Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values. Private Rights. and the Evolution Toward an 
Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the 
Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications oiStates, Properly Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. 
ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (2007). 
215. SLADE, supra note 214, at 2, 230. 
216. [d. 
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developable areas.217 
Many courts find the public trust doctrine applies at least to submerged 
and tide-flowed lands. Thus, in the landmark case of Illinois Central Railroad 
Co. v. Illinois,218 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Illinois legislature could 
not transfer land in fee simple under Lake Michigan because that land was held 
in public trust for the people of the state. However, the state could sell small 
parcels of public trust land, the use of which would promote the public 
interest-for example, docks, piers, and wharves-so long as this did not 
impair the public interest in the lake and the remaining submerged land. In 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,219 the Court extended the public trust to 
all lands under waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the tides. 
Some jurisdictions have drastically expanded their public trust doctrines. 
Perhaps the biggest extension of the public trust doctrine is represented by 
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association,220 extending the public trust 
doctrine of New Jersey to private dry sand beach areas for both access to and 
limited use of the ocean and foreshore. The court held that the public rights to 
the water would be meaningless unless the public were guaranteed both access 
and a place to rest intermittently. A trial court in California held that the state's 
public trust doctrine could be used to regulate the extraction of groundwater 
from private property, if such extraction had a "damaging" effect on nearby 
navigable waterways.221 In doing so, the court declined to declare that the 
public trust extended to groundwater, but held that groundwater could be 
regulated so far as it affected public trust waters. The Supreme Court of Hawaii 
has declared that all water in the state is subject to the public trust,222 and has 
imposed heightened duties to protect and manage the public trust on all county 
government agencies.223 The Colorado Supreme Court recently allowed a 
proposed ballot initiative, which would amend the state's Constitution to create 
an expansive public trust over "Colorado's environment, meaning 'clean air, 
pure water, and natural and scenic values,' " to survive a technical legal 
challenge.224 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin even extended the public trust 
doctrine to a wetland, which became a bird sanctuary, created by the property 
owner in the course of development in R. W Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin. 225 
Courts have also confirmed that the public trust doctrine can impose 
217. E.g., Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 214, at 19 (noting 
that New Jersey has recognized "public trust rights to use the dry sand (above the high tide line) portions of 
both public and private beaches"). 
218. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
219. 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
220. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
221. Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Control Res. Bd., No. 34-2010-8000583, at ·15 (Super. Ct. 
Sacramento Cnty. July 15,2014). 
222. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 PJd 409, 490 (Haw. 2000). 
223. Kauai Springs, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n ofKaua'i, 324 PJd 951, 984 (Haw. 2014). 
224. In re Title, Ballot Title, & Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #89, 328 P.3d 172, 175 (Colo. 2014). 
225. 628 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2001). 
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severe limitations on the rights of property owners.226 A recent example is 
Public Lands Access Association v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Madison County, 227 where the Supreme Court of Montana considered a case 
in which a landowner asserted that the Montana public trust doctrine had taken 
his right to exclude the public from his privately owned streambed. The court 
held that the private landowner, who owned both sides of the river as well as 
the streambed, could not prevent the public from using a county road that ran 
through his land and over the river as a bridge (which was acquired by the 
public from the previous owner by prescription), as an access point for 
recreation in the river. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the trial court 
in finding that "where a county road intersects state waters, the portion of each 
which is congruent with tne other creates two overlapping public rights of 
way.,,228 The court explained that no taking had occurred because no right had 
been extracted from the landowner, as the public had "no interest at all in the 
private streambed per se, but only in the publically-owned surface waters that 
traverse the streambed."229 The concurring opinion made clear that the 
landowner had never had the right to exclude the public because the public trust 
was the law of Montana at the time that the landowner acquired title to the 
streambed.23o 
Building upon the growing body of law finding that private land 
impressed with a public trust may be regulated with impunity specifically as a 
"background principles" exception is McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council.23 I McQueen purchased two noncontiguous lots adjacent to man-made 
canals in the early 1960s, but left them unimproved until the early 1990s, by 
which time neighboring lots were improved with bulkheads and retaining walls, 
while McQueen's had "reverted" to tidelands. When McQueen applied to the 
appropriate state authority for permission to backfill his lots and build his own 
bulkhead, the state denied the requisite permit on the ground that it would 
destroy the "critical environment" on those lots. Both a special master and the 
court of appeals agreed that the denial left the lots without any economically 
beneficial use, which resulted in a total taking under Lucas.232 Initially, the 
state supreme court denied relief because it found "confusion" over whether the 
"investment-backed expectations" standard-a "partial takings" standard as 
appears below-applied to total takings.233 After the U.S. Supreme Court 
226. See Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072-86 (Wash. 1987); Madison v. Graham, 126 F. Supp. 
2d 1320 (D. Mont. 2001), ajJ'd 316 F.3d 867 (9th CiT. 2002); Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine 
Cnty., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
227. 321 P.3d 38 (Mont. 2014). 
228. [d. at 51. 
229. Jd. at 53. 
230. [d. at 67-68. 
231. 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003). 
232. McQueen v. S.c. Coastal Council, 496 S.E.2d 643 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998). 
233. McQueen, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2000). 
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vacated and remanded234 for further consideration in light of Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island,235 the South Carolina Supreme Court denied compensation on 
the ground that South Carolina holds "presumptive title" to land below the high 
water mark236 and "wetlands created by the encroachment of navigable tidal 
water belong to the state."237 Moreover, the state also has "exclusive right to 
control land below the high water mark for the public benefit and cannot permit 
activity that substantially impairs the public interest in marine life, water 
quality, or public access.,,238 The court then held that so much of McQueen's 
lots as had "reverted to tidelands" were "public trust property subject to control 
of the State.239 
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of 
Environment Protection,240 a group of coastal property owners claimed a taking 
of their littoral rights after the state, under a shore protection statute, fixed their 
seaward boundaries with an erosion-control line and sea wall that followed the 
mean high-water line. The state then restored seventy-five feet of beach and 
pronounced the new land to be state property, thus depriving the formerly-
littoral owners of that status as well as any future addition to the beach by 
accretion. The landowners' rights of access to the ocean, however, were 
preserved. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Florida Supreme Court, 
holding that the statute did not deprive the owners of property rights because 
the land reclaimed by the state was in the public trust area and, at common law, 
land created by avulsion-even purposefully by the state-goes to the state. 
Because "[t]wo core principles of Florida property law intersect[ed] in this 
case" in favor of the state, the court held that "[t]he Florida Supreme Court 
decision before us is consistent with ... background principles of state property 
law[,]" and therefore no taking had occurred.24I 
Not all courts have been quick to accept extensions of the public trust 
doctrine, and even those that accept it within its traditional limits often permit 
limited private use of public trust resources. Thus, in Kootenai Environmental 
234. McQueen v. S.C. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, 533 U.S. 943 (2001), granting cert. to. 
vacating. and remanding McQueen, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.c. 2003). 
235. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). In Palazzolo, an owner of coastal wetlands denied fill pennits for construction 
of a private beach club successfully appealed in part a Rhode Island Supreme Court decision that his takings 
claims were unripe, that his title never included the right to fill the wetlands because he acquired the property 
after the regulations preventing the same had been adopted, and that he had not met the tests of either Lucas or 
Penn Central. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the claims were ripe, that regulations could not "put an 
expiration date on the Takings Clause," and that the remaining use value in the uplands portion of the property 
for a single-family residence foreclosed a Lucas claim, but the court remanded for consideration under Penn 
Central. Id. at 608, 626-27, 630-31. 
236. McQueen v. S.c. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.c. 2003). 
237. Id. at 120. 
238. Id. (citations omitted). 
239. Id. 
240. 560 U.S. 702 (2010), affg Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d I \02 (Fla. 
2008). 
241. Id. at 730-31. 
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Alliance, Inc. v. State Board of Land Commissioners,242 the Idaho Supreme 
Court approved the leasing of state lands impressed with a public trust to a 
private club for the construction, maintenance, and use of private docking 
facilities on a bay in a navigable lake, on the grounds that such lease and use 
was "not incompatible" with the public trust imposed on the property. Also, 
the Maine Supreme Court in Bell v. Town of Wells Beach,243 held that attempts 
to cross private land to reach public land for recreational purposes in 
accordance with the state's Public Trust and Intertidal Land Act resulted in a 
taking of private property without compensation. The Massachusetts Supreme 
Court refused to expand statutory declarations of public trust to permit access 
across private land to reach inter-tidal lands, in Opinion of the Justices: 244 
The pennanent physical intrusion into the property of private persons, which the 
bill would establish, is a taking of property within even the most narrow 
construction of that phrase possible under the Constitutions of the 
Commonwealth and of the United States. . . . The interference with private 
prope~ here involves a wholesale denial of an owner's right to exclude the 
public. 45 
To the same effect, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Opinion of the 
Justices (Public Use of Coastal Beaches),246 held that a new statute providing 
for access to tide-flowed public trust shoreline across abutting private land was 
a taking: 
When the government unilaterally authorizes a pennanent, public easement 
across private lands, this constitutes a taking requmng just 
compensation .... Because the bill provides no compensation for the landowners 
whose property may be burdened by the general recreational easement 
established for public use, it violates the prohibition contained in our State and 
Federal Constitutions against the taking of private property for public use without 
just compensation. Although the State has the power to pennit a comprehensive 
beach access and use program by using its eminent domain power and 
compensating private property owners, it may not take property rights without 
compensation through legislative decree.247 
The same court drove home these advisory points when five years later it 
considered an actual case and controversy248 in which forty beachfront property 
owners sued the state on regulatory taking grounds when the state moved a 
public trust lands boundary line inland from the mean high water mark: 
Having detennined that New Hampshire common law limits public ownership 
of the shore lands to the mean high water mark, we conclude that the legislature 
went beyond these common law limits by extending public trust rights to the 
highest high water mark .... Because [the statute] unilaterally authorizes the 
taking of private shoreland for public use and provides no compensation for 
242. 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983). 
243. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989). 
244. 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974). 
245. /d. at 568. 
246. 649 A.2d 604 (N.H. 1994). 
247. [d. at611. 
248. See generally Purdie v. Attorney General, 732 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1999). 
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landowners whose property has been appropriated, it violates [the State 
Constitution] and the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution against the 
taking of property for public use without just compensation .... Although it may 
be desirable for the State to expand public beaches to cope with increasing 
crowds, the State may not do so without compensating the affected 
landowners.249 
More recently, in Severance v. Patterson,250 the Supreme Court of Texas 
answered questions certified from the federal court of appeals and reversed a 
line of state appellate court decisions dating from 1979251 on so-called "rolling 
easements," holding that: 
when a beach front vegetation line is suddenly and dramatically pushed landward 
by acts of nature, an existing public easement on the public beach does not "roll" 
inland to other parts of the parcel or onto a new parcel of land .... In those 
situations, when changes occur suddenly and perceptibly to materially alter 
littoral boundaries, the land encumbered by the easement is lost to the public trust, 
along with the easement attached to that land.252 
The Court thus rejected the state's attempt to declare an expansive public 
right to private land under the guise of the public trust doctrine, and clarified 
that the "division between public and private ownership remains at the mean 
high tide line in the wake of naturally occurring changes, and even when 
boundaries seem to change suddenly."253 
Following its decision in Severance, the Supreme Court of Texas vacated 
a Texas appellate court's holding that rolling easements had extended state and 
public ownership to a privately owned beach front parcel (complete with a 
beach house) after storms pushed the vegetation line landward of the house.254 
On remand, the homeowners asserted an inverse condemnation claim in light 
of Severance, while an intervening environmental group urged a narrow 
reading of the opinion.255 The appellate court, faced with a new round of 
briefings, remanded the case back to trial court. 
Finally, in an unusual opinion, a California trial court recently held that 
the Public Trust doctrine did not extend to tidelands along a privately owned 
California beach.256 Martin's Beach, accessible only by a path through private 
property, was a popular recreational area until the new owner of the property 
installed a gate to block the public from the beach. An organization called 
Friends of Martin's Beach sued to regain access. The court found that Martin's 
Beach was ceded by Mexico to the United States in the 1850 Treaty of 
249. Id. at 447. 
250. 370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012). 
251. Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 
App. 1986); Arrington v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. App. 1989). 
252. Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 708, 724. 
253. Id. at 725. 
254. Brannan v. State, 390 S.W.3d 301, 302 (Tex. 2013). 
255. Brannan v. State, No. 01-08-001 79-CV, 2014 WL 1778276, at *1 (Tex. App. May 1,2014). 
256. Friends of Martin's Beach v. Martin's Beach I, LLC, No. CIV517634, slip op. at 2 (Super. Ct. San 
Mateo Cnty. Apr. 30, 2014). 
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Guadalupe Hidalgo. Pursuant to the treaty, Martin's Beach had gone straight 
into private ownership through a land patent granted by the Board of California 
Land Commissioners, which made no mention of a public trust interest. 
Relying on a string of U.S. Supreme Court cases,257 the court found that the 
"State's public trust easement only exists over lands to which the State acquired 
title by virtue of its sovereignty upon admission to the the United States",258 
and that the land patent granted by the Board of California Land Commissioners 
to defendant's predecessor in interest operated as a "quitclaim deed from the 
Government of the United States to the claimant relinquishing all interests in 
the land that might be possessed by the United States or its people including the 
people of the State ofCalifornia."259 Therefore, the court reasoned, California 
had never possessed any interest in the privately owned tidelands of Martin's 
Beach before or after admission into the United States, and accordingly did not 
hold it in public trust. 
ii. Customary Law as a Background Principle 
Customary rights in land usually arise when a group or class of persons 
can show a right to do a particular thing or practice upon land that they neither 
own nor otherwise possess the right to do the activity in question, based upon 
past and unchallenged practice extending back over some time. In other words, 
the claimant to the custom would be a trespasser on the land of another but for 
the custom. The reception of customary law in the United States was originally 
chilly despite its common, although restricted, use in England. The reasons had 
much to do with the limitations on use resulting from the application of the 
doctrine, and the difficulties in terminating a custom, once found or declared. 
The former has much to do with the source of customary law in the United 
States: Blackstone's Commentaries. Designed to limit the intrusion of custom 
into common law generally, in his section on customary law Blackstone spells 
out several limitations on customary laws, including the need for ancient origin, 
and sharp restrictions on land area and possession to which a customary right 
could accrue. Several of those limitations make their way into U.S. case law. 
The latter issue was of particular concern to the legendary John Chipman Gray, 
of future interests and the rule against perpetuities fame, who cautioned against 
the establishment of yet another collection of perpetual interests in property: 
"Especially it should be remembered that they cannot be released, for no 
inhabitant, or body of inhabitants, is entitled to speak for future inhabitants. 
Such rights form perpetuities of the most objectionable character."260 
257. United States v. Alviso, 64 U.S. 318 (1859); Bear v. Federy, 70 U.S. 478 (1865); Summa Corp. v. 
California, 466 U.S. 198 (1984). 
258. Friends of Martin's Beach, No. CIV517634 slip op. at 10. 
259. Jd. at *11. 
260. JOHN CHIPMAN ORA Y, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 586 (4th ed., 1942). For fuller treatment 
of customary law, see, e.g., David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and 
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An early nineteenth century court put it well in Ackerman v. Shelp,261 in 
which a custom was alleged to permit inhabitants of a town an easement to 
reach a riverbank: 
[I]f[this] custom ... is to prevail according to the common law notion of it, these 
lots must lie open forever to the surprise of unsuspecting owners, and to the 
curtailing [of] commerce, in its more advanced state, of the accommodation of 
docks and wharves, when perhaps a tenth part of the lots now open would be all 
sufficient as watering places; a principle of such extensive operation ought not to 
be strained beyond the limits assigned to it in law. If [the] public convenience 
requires high ways to church, school, mill, market or water, they are obtainable 
in a much more direct and rational manner under the statute than by way of 
immemorial usage and custom.262 
Despite this admonitory background concerning the problems associated 
with custom, modern courts in the United States have declared public rights or 
rights of a huge class of strangers to cross private land based exclusively on 
some version of customary law. Perhaps the most famous of these is State ex 
rei. Thornton v. Hay,263 in which the plaintiffs sought to prevent the Hays from 
constructing improvements on the dry-sand beach portion of their lot between 
the high water line and the upland vegetation line. Rejecting the proffered bases 
of prescriptive rights and easements, the court decided in favor of the plaintiffs, 
sua sponte extending customary rights to virtually the entire population of 
Oregon along its entire coastline: 
Because many elements of prescription are present in this case, the state has relied 
upon the doctrine in support of the decree below. We believe, however, that there 
is a better legal basis for affirming the decree. The most cogent basis for the 
decision in this case is the English doctrine of custom. Strictly construed, 
prescription applies only to the specific tract ofland before the court, and doubtful 
prescription cases could fill the courts for years with tract-by-tract litigation. An 
established custom, on the other hand, can be proven with reference to a larger 
region. Ocean-front lands from the northern to the southern border of the state 
ought to be treated uniformly. 264 
Lest the reach of custom be misunderstood in a per se, total regulatory 
takings context under Lucas, the same court in Stevens v. City of Cannon 
Beach265 responded to a takings claim over the refusal of local government to 
grant a seawall permit on customary rights interference grounds, and held that 
the customary law of Oregon preventing such construction was a background 
principle of state property law and therefore an exception to the categorical total 
takings rule when a property owner was left with no economically beneficial 
use of his land. 
Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1375 (\996); Paul M. Sullivan, Customary Revolutions: The Law 0/ 
Custom and the Conflict o/Traditions in Hawai 'i, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 99 (1998); and David L. Callies, Custom 
and the Public Trost: Background Principles o/State Property Law? 30 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10003 (2000). 
261. 8 N.1.L. 125 (N.J. 1825). 
262. Id. at 130-3 I. 
263. 462 P.2d 67\ (Or. \969). 
264. Id. at 676. 
265. 854 P.2d 449 (Or. \993). 
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Beaches, custom, and the public trust doctrine intersected in Florida in 
Trepanier v. County of Volusia,266 an inverse condemnation action where a 
state appellate court clarified the standard for establishing a customary right 
and rejected any Oregon~style creation of state-wide rights as in State ex rei. 
Thornton v. Hay. The plaintiffs owned littoral parcels which, under Florida's 
public trust doctrine, included fee title to the mean high tide line in an area of 
New Smyrna Beach where the public, as regulated by the county, regularly 
drove and parked on the beach.267 Between the roadway and the sand dunes, 
the county maintained a thirty-foot habitat conservation zone ("HCZ") for the 
protection of endangered sea turtles.268 Before 1999, the roadway and the 
marked HCZ were in the public trust area outside plaintiffs' platted lots, but a 
series of avulsive events (i.e., hurricanes and other storms) moved the mean 
high water line to within a few feet of plaintiffs' sea walls.269 The county 
gradually moved the roadway and HCZ inland along with it to occupy 
plaintiffs' dry sand beach.270 The trial court initially granted summary 
judgment to the county, holding that the public had a "superior claim to 
possession and use" of the dry sand beach by virtue of custom, prescription, 
and dedication and proclaimed that such applied to all beaches in the county.271 
The appellate court, however, reversed and remanded.272 After 
distinguishing custom from the public trust doctrine-the public trust area 
migrates with the changing shoreline but the same is not necessarily true of 
privately-owned areas subject to customary right273-the court held that the 
county not only needed to prove the elements of custom for the specific area 
subject to the alleged customary right but also that the right customarily 
migrated with the high tide line.274 While the court found clear proof that there 
had never been any intent to dedicate the land, it concluded that genuine issues 
of material fact existed with respect to the county's counterclaims of 
prescription and custom, with the court characterizing the latter as the county's 
best argument.275 According to the court: 
[i]n addition to the temporal requirement of "ancient" use, three other key 
elements must be proven: peaceableness, certainty and consistency. Finally, the 
customary use must be shown to be "reasonable." While some may find it 
preferable that proof of these elements of custom be established for the entire 
state by judicial fiat in order to protect the right of public access to Florida's 
beaches, it appears to us that the acquisition of a right to use private property by 
266. 965 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. 2007). 
267. Id. at 278, 280. 
268. Id. at 278-79. 
269. Id. at 278. 
270. Id. at 279. 
271. Id. at 280. 
272. Id. at 278. 
273. Id. at 290. 
274. Id. at 293. 
275. Id. 
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custom is intensely local and anything but theoretical.276 
Sidestepping the awkward notion that any use of an automobile could be 
considered "ancient," the court remanded for presentation of specific 
evidence.277 
After redefining "ancient" to be "historic" and asserting that one hundred 
years of substantially uninterrupted use qualified as such, the trial court 
ultimately held the custom proved and that the customary right had migrated 
inland after avulsive events.278 Although concluding that the plaintiff had not 
proved the elements of inverse condemnation, the court made it clear that any 
takings claim would have been defeated by the customary right. 279 
Other jurisdictions have refused to recognize that customary law can 
create a right of public access to private property. In Almeder v. Town of 
Kennebunkport,280 the Supreme Court of Maine vacated a trial court's finding 
. ,that the public enjoyed an easement by custom to engage in recreational 
activities on privately owned portions of a beach. Goose Rocks Beach, a two 
mile stretch of beach bordered by 110 privately owned parcels, was widely used 
by the public via five public beach access points and 179 public parking spots 
on two neighboring roads.281 The Town of Kennebunkport had continuously 
passed regulations concerning the beach since the 1700s, including more recent 
prohibitions concerning pets and open fires.282 Moreover, the town had 
provided a lifeguard from 1950 until 1994, when the lifeguard services were 
discontinued and "replaced ... with a police officer dedicated to serv[ing] the 
Beach."283 The public enjoyed a similarly long history of beach use stretching 
back to colonial times. More recently, the public "regularly user d] the full 
length of the Beach year-round to walk, play in tidal pools, collect sand dollars, 
play softball, ride horses, and cross-country ski, and to access the water for 
boating, water-skiing, windsurfing, kayaking, snorkeling, rafting, 
paddleboarding, and tubing. ,,284 
In 2009 the beach front parcel owners sued the town and any other party 
claiming any title or right to use the beach, seeking: 
(1) a declaratory judgment affirming his or her ownership and exclusive right to 
use that portion of the Beach abutting his or her parcel down to the mean low-
water mark, 'subject only to the public rights of usage in the Intertidal Property 
established by the Colonial Ordinance of 1647,' and (2) to quiet title to his or her 
claimed Beach property.285 
276. Id. at 289. 
277. Id. 282,293. 
278. Id. at 282. 
279. Id. at 283, 293. 
280. 2014 Me. 12 (2014). 
281. Id. at *\. 
282. Id. at *2. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. at *1. 
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The town filed counterclaims alleging its "ownership of the [b leach and 
the public's right to use the [b]each," while the state of Maine intervened to 
protect the public's rights pursuant to the public trust doctrine.286 Of relevance 
to this section, the town asserted that the public had obtained an easement by 
custom to the beach by virtue ofthe undisputed centuries of public use.287 The 
trial court held a bifurcated trial, the first portion of which dealt exclusively 
with use-related claims.288 At this first trial the court found that that the public 
had acquired rights to Goose Rock Beach through prescription, the public trust 
doctrine, and custom.289 
The Supreme Court of Maine reversed the trial court's fmdings in their 
entirety. The court held that the presumption of permissive use defeated the 
claim that the public had gained rights to the beach by prescription,290 and that 
findings relating to the public trust were premature.291 Significantly, the court 
also vacated the trial court's finding of a public easement by custom and 
clarified Maine's position on the use of custom as a source of public rights. In 
a single unambiguous paragraph, the court characterized customary law as 
"largely a dead doctrine in the United States," and declared that an easement 
by custom was not, and never had been, a viable cause of action in Maine.292 
Similarly, in Severance v. Patterson, the Supreme Court of Texas found 
that customary law could not establish a public right to "rolling easements" 
(discussed above in the public trust section) along the coast of Texas.293 The 
Court summarized its objection to customary law as a background principle of 
state property law: 
The State's position and the dissents suffer from the same fundamental flaw. 
They all fail to cite any authority for the proposition that background principles 
of Texas property law preclude private beachfront property owners from ever 
having had the right to exclude strangers from their land, as other Texas property 
owners do. The Texas appellate opinions discussed, being at most a few decades 
old, are not authority going back to 'time immemorial' and they do not cite any 
authority for such an ancient, inherent limitation?94 
iii. Statutes as Background Principles 
More troubling is the occasional case finding background principles in 
preexisting statutes, which would broaden the exception considerably-and is 
likely contrary to the implications of Lucas which, after all, did involve the 
application of a statute. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court of New 
286. Id. 
287. Id. 
288. /d. 
289. Id. at *3. 
290. Id. at *5-8. 
291. Id. at *9. 
292. Id. 
293. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.w.3d 705, 708 (Tex. 2012). 
294. Id. at 730. 
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Hampshire held that a "positive law" could be construed as a background 
principle if it were passed prior to the landowner's acquisition of the subject 
parcel.295 Similarly, the federal circuit, drawing an analogy to the Lucas 
nuisance exception, noted that an existing bankruptcy statute could "inhere" in 
the plaintiffs' franchise contract and thereby limit plaintiffs' cognizable 
property interest and ability to recover compensation for certain takings.296 In 
a strange twist on the law of background principles exceptions, a court of 
appeals in Arizona denied a takings claim by a landowner over whose property 
flowed (by state permit) water for another landowner whose use of property 
(underground water storage) depended upon flowing water via his private 
stream.297 The court held that the doctrine of prior appropriation, upon which 
the permit was based, was a background principle of Arizona's water law, 
rendering such a takings claim impossible under a Lucas exception.298 
Finally, in 1256 Hertel Ave. Associates, LLC v. Calloway,299 the Second 
Circuit extended the Lucas "background principle" status to New York's 
homestead exemption statute. In force since 1850, the homestead statute 
allowed debtor homeowners to exempt portions of their home equity from 
money judgments during bankruptcy proceedings. 300 In line with a long history 
of raising the exempted amount to adjust for inflation, New York increased the 
homestead exemption from $10,000 to $50,000 in 2005, and to $75,000 in 
2010. In 2003, 1256 Hertel Ave. Associates, LLC ("Hertel") obtained a 
judgment lien on Calloway's home, while another creditor obtained a second 
lien on the property in 2008.301 In 2009 Calloway filed for bankruptcy, and 
moved to "avoid the judgment liens against her residence pursuant to New 
York's homestead exemption.,,302 
In bankruptcy court, Calloway argued that her $25,000 in home equity 
was protected under the $50,000 exemption provided for at the time that she 
filed for bankruptcy.303 Hertel agreed that the homestead exemption did apply, 
but contended that the applicable exemption was the $10,000 provided for at 
the time that the lien was perfected in 2003.304 Moreover, Hertel argued that 
retroactive application of the 2005 homestead exemption amendment to its 
2003 lien would constitute a taking without compensation.305 The bankruptcy 
court found that Calloway's home equity was exempted up to $50,000, and 
dismissed Hertel's taking claim because "under New York law, judgment liens 
295. Sanderson v. Town of Candia, 787 A.2d 167,169 (N.H. 2001). 
296. A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d \142, \152 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
297. W. Maricopa Combine, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep't of Water Res., 26 P.3d 1171, 1173 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). 
298. Id. at 1180. 
299. 761 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 2014). 
300. Id. at 255. 
301. Id. 
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305. Id. 
2014] Through a Glass Clearly 89 
are not vested property interests."306 A district court affinned.307 
The Second Circuit engaged in statutory construction and ultimately 
detennined that the New York legislature intended for the 2005 amendment to 
apply retroactively.308 The court next held that liens were a protected property 
interest under the Fifth Amendment,309 but that Hertel's taking claim 
nevertheless potentially failed for several reasons. First, it arguably applies 
only to interests in land.3!0 Second, Calloway might have had less than $10,000 
worth of equity in her home at the time of the 2003 judgment lien, in which 
case Hertel's distinct investment-backed expectations were not hanned by 
retroactive application of the amendment because Calloway's home equity was 
always protected by the homestead exemption amount.3!! 
Ultimately, the court decided to reject Hertel's taking claim by concluding 
that New York's homestead exemption constituted a background principle of 
the state's property law: 
New York's homestead exemption is of a [early] vintage-from a time if not 
quite immemorial, then at least nearly so. Hertel obtained its judgment lien 
against a backdrop of New York law that has continuously provided a homestead 
exemption for more than 150 years. Dating from 1850, New York's homestead 
exemption has now become a "background principle of the State's law of 
property.,,3!2 
The court held that the homestead exemption, as necessarily adjusted for 
inflation, inhered in all judgment liens perfected within the state.3!3 Therefore, 
the 2005 amendment did not effect a taking.3!4 In a footnote to the opinion, the 
court further explained: 
[a]lthough we do not here attempt to delineate a precise division between 
"background" and "foreground" laws, after more than 150 years, New York's 
homestead exemption qualifies as part of 'those common, shared understandings 
of permissible limitations derived from a State's legal tradition.'3!5 
B. Partial Takings 
A partial taking occurs whenever a land use regulation deprives a 
landowner of sufficient use and value but stops short of depriving the 
landowner of all economically beneficial use. Partial takings by regulation are 
far more common than total takings, and the standard is not so easy to apply. 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City a/New York,316 the Court set 
306. ld. at 256. 
307. ld. 
308. ld. at 257-61. 
309. ld. at 262-63. 
310. ld. 
311. ld. at 265. 
312. ld. at 266 (quoting Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)). 
313. Jd. 
314. ld. at 267. 
315. ld. 
316. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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out the rules for partial takings. The Court upheld New York City's Landmarks 
Preservation Law, which effectively prohibited Penn Central from constructing 
a fifty-five story office building in the air rights above Grand Central Station, a 
designated landmark under the law.317 Penn Central claimed both the 
designation and the prohibition constituted a facial- and applied-taking of its 
property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 3 18 The Court held that 
"landmarking" itself was broadly constitutional and that the individual 
application of the law to Grand Central Station left sufficient remaining use of 
the property so as to be neither a total nor a partial taking.319 Before reaching 
the merits of the case, however, the Court discussed in some detail the standards 
that applied in partial takings cases. The Court suggested "several factors" that 
have "particular significance" when it engages in "these essentially ad hoc, 
factual inquiries:" 320 
(1) The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations (later also "reasonable expectations of the 
claimant"). 
(2) The character of the governmental action. A "taking" may more 
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a 
physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some 
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote 
the common good.321 
A number of cases pick up this theme of "investment-backed 
expectations"-including the Lucas decision discussed above.322 While 
largely devoted to answering the blistering barrage directed at the Court by the 
dissent (for example, the dissent's opening salvo is: "Today the Court launches 
a missile to kill a mouse,,323), the Lucas notes demonstrate a clear intention to 
allow compensation for taking of less than all economic use if and when such 
a taking is before the Court. In Lucas footnote eight, the Court responds to a 
dissent criticism that compensation for regulatory taking of all economic use is 
not consistent with lack of compensation for regulatory taking of, say, ninety-
five percent of economic use: 
This analysis errs in its assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one 
step short of complete is not entitled to compensation. Such an owner might not 
317. See id. at 115-16,138. 
318. See id. at 128-29. 
319. Seeid. at 128-38. 
320. See id. at 123-28. 
321. ld. at 124 (citations omitted). 
322. See Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8; see generally Adams Outdoor Adver. v. 
City of East Lansing, 614 N.W.2d 634 (Mich. 2000); Walcek v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 462 (2000); Dis!. 
Intown Props. v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Dodd v. Hood River Cnty., 136 F.3d 
1219 (9th Cir. 1998); K & K Constr. Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998); Alegria v. 
R.E. Keeney, 687 A.2d 1249 (R.I. 1997). 
323· Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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be able to claim the benefit of our categorical fonnulation, but, as we have 
acknowledged time and again, "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant and ... the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations" are keenly relevant to takings and analysis 
generally.324 
91 
This "frustration of investment-backed expectations" standard, which the 
Court chose not to apply in Lucas because it characterized the regulatory taking 
as total, is clearly not rejected. Indeed, one concurring member of the Court in 
Lucas (Justice Kennedy) would have applied it.325 
C. The Relevant Parcel 
In Agins v. City ofTiburon,326 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a Takings 
Clause challenge to a zoning ordinance that required that property be used for 
single family homes rather than multiple family dwellings so that the owners 
could not build apartment buildings. Notwithstanding that the ordinance would 
substantially reduce the value of the property, the Court concluded that there 
was not a taking because the owner still had reasonable economically viable 
use of the property. Later in Lingle v. Chevron US.A. Inc., the U.S. Supreme 
Court eliminated that part of the Fifth Amendment Agins rule, which required 
that a regulation "substantially advance a legitimate state interest.,,327 In an 
earlier footnote, the Court had already alluded to the utility of the "reasonable 
expectations standard," though in a slightly different context-that of deciding 
how thin to slice property interests (or, alternatively, how many sticks in the 
Holfeldian bundle) for purposes of deciding whether property has been taken: 
regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically feasible 
use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the 
"property interest" against which the loss of value is to be measured. When for 
example, a regulation requires a developer to leave ninety percent of a rural 
tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as 
one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of 
the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a 
mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole. 
Footnote eight also criticizes that portion of the New York state court's 
decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, which 
suggested nearby property of the owner could be amalgamated with that portion 
he claimed was unusual in deciding whether a taking by regulation had 
occurred. 
324. ld. at 1019 n.8 (alteration in original)(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 
104, 124 (1978». 
325. ld. at 1032-36. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
326. 447 U.S. 255 (19&0). 
327. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005). The Court held that the "substantially 
advances" test is appropriately part of a Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment takings inquiry. ld. 
at 540-541. 
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The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's reasonable 
expectations have been shaped by the state's law of property-i.e., whether and 
to what degree the state's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to 
the particular interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a 
diminution in (or elimination of) value.328 
In Lost Tree Village Corporation v. United States,329 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the court below improperly 
aggregated parcels of property for the purpose of determining the "relevant 
parcel" (the so-called denominator issue) in taking might occur under a Penn 
Central analysis, holding that merely holding title to contiguous parcels was 
not by itself sufficient to include defined parcels as part of the parcel as a whole, 
a critical determination in deciding whether permitted development on such 
additional parcels should figure into the calculus of deciding when a 
landowner's distinct, investment-backed expectations have been frustrated by 
a land use regulation. In this instance, the landowner was denied a dredge and 
fill permit by the Army Corps of Engineers for a small parcel, rendering it 
economically undevelopable. The lower court had held that distinct adjacent 
parcels should be considered in deciding the issue of economic developability. 
The Court of Appeals held only the one undevelopable parcel should be 
considered. Contrast that case with the decision of the South Carolina Supreme 
Court in Dunes West Golf Club v. Town of Mount Pleasant,330 which held that 
the landowner had not carried its burden of separating out an undeveloped 
parcel for regulatory takings treatment. The owner had only made that 
argument recently and had changed its views several times during the course of 
the litigation.331 
V. RIPENESS 
The question of when a regulatory takings claim is "ripe" for review arises 
because of certain tests that the U.S. Supreme Court has articulated in deciding 
such claims. Unless a court can determine the extent of economic loss (whether 
partial or total), it cannot decide whether a regulatory taking has occurred. 
Moreover, particularly when the claimant sues under the U.S. Constitution's 
Fifth Amendment, the issue of monetary loss to the landowner is critical since 
the amendment does not bar takings, but only takings without compensation. 
These considerations underlie the so-called "ripeness doctrine," which is set out 
in the discussion of the Court's Williamson County decision below. Ever since, 
328. Id. at 1016 n.17. For a different perspective on the "investment-backed expectations" standards, see 
generally Daniel R. Mande1ker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215 (1995); 
Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in 
Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REv. 91 (1995). 
329. 707 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
330. 737 S.E.2d 601 (S.C. 2013). 
331. For suggestions on detennining the relevant parcel, see Dwight H. Merriam, Rules for the Relevant 
Parcel, 25 U. HAW. L. REv. 353 (2003). 
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this "prudential" inquiry has become a virtually insuperable barrier to bringing 
regulatory takings claims, particularly as some courts converted the two part 
test into a jurisdictional, rather than a prudential doctrine. Moreover, the 
application of the test has become a dilemma for plaintiff landowners because 
of the element of preclusion that is introduced. Fortunately, a new wave of 
decisions appear to be restoring some sanity to the application of the ripeness 
rule, making it again "prudential," which allows courts to refuse to apply in 
particularly egregious circumstances in which the plaintiff landowner has spent 
years in court simply attempting to get to the merits of a takings claim. 
It all began with Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City. In Williamson County, the Court barred 
Hamilton Bank, the owner of a parcel that was denied development approval 
by Williamson County, from bringing a regulatory taking claim in federal court 
because the claim was not "ripe." Ripeness, according to the Court, required 
that the landowner (1) obtain a "final decision" from the relevant state or county 
agencies on its application for development (in that case, subdivision 
approval)332 and (2) seek and fail to obtain compensation for the regulatory 
taking in state court.333 Noting that the property owner had sought neither a 
variance nor similar land use exception for its project, nor compensation for the 
alleged taking, the Court held that Hamilton Bank failed on both "prongs" of 
the ripeness test and so could not bring a substantive takings challenge in 
federal court. Both the final decision rule and the compensation requirement 
raise considerable barriers to the bringing of regulatory takings challenges to 
land use controls.334 
The subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. 
City and County of San Francisc0335 demonstrates indirectly the efforts of 
applying the ripeness doctrine to regulating takings disputes. However, the San 
Remo decision deals directly with neither prong, but rather with the preclusion 
problem created for litigants whom federal courts direct to first seek relief in 
state court under either or both prongs of Williamson County. Such litigants 
that dutifully bring their claims in state court are denied relief, and return to 
federal court, only to find that they are then precluded from "relitigating" the 
takings claims in the original federal court.336 
332. Id. at 186-94. 
333. Id. at 194-97. 
334. For critical comment on the insuperable barrier which Williamson County thus imposes, see Thomas 
E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings Litigation, II J. LAND USE & ENVTL. 
L. 37 (1995); Michael M. Berger, The Ripeness Mess in Federal Land Use Cases, or How the Supreme Court 
Converted Federal Judges into Fruit Peddlers, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 
(1991). 
335. 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
336. See Mitchell v. Mills Cnty., 673 F. Supp. 332, 336 (S.D. Iowa 1987), aff'd., 847 F.2d 1988 (8th Cir. 
1988), Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 825 (2003); see 
also Thomas E. Roberts, Fifth Amendment Taking Claim in Federal Court: The State Compensation 
Requirement and Principles of Res Judicata, 24 URB. LAW. 479 (1992). 
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The San Remo decision is important as much for what the Court addresses 
as for what it does not. Carefully noting what of the petition for certiorari it 
chooses to address, Justice Stevens, writing for five justices, set out the narrow 
question before the court: "This case presents the question whether federal 
courts may craft an exception to the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738, for claims brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.,,337 The correctness or continued validity of the Williamson 
County ripeness test was not addressed.338 The Court dealt only with the 
narrow question of a remedy for preclusion under the full faith and credit 
statute. 
Petitioners owned and operated a three-story, sixty-two unit hotel in San 
Francisco as a bed and breakfast inn. While the hotel housed "dislocated 
individuals, immigrants, artists, and laborers"339 after the 1906 earthquake, it 
housed primarily tourists by 1979, when San Francisco passed an ordinance 
instituting a moratorium on the conversion of residential hotel units into tourist 
units. The ordinance required a permit for such conversion, obtainable only if 
an applicant constructed new units, rehabilitated old ones, or paid an "in lieu" 
fee into a city fund for such construction or rehabilitation. Unfortunately, an 
employee of petitioner erroneously reported the hotel's units as "residential," 
thereby triggering the aforesaid requirements for a permit. In 1993 the City 
Planning Commission granted petitioners the permit, but only upon the 
condition that petitioners pay a $567,000 in lieu fee. 
A number of administrative and court appeals followed in both state and 
federal court, in which the petitioners claimed a regulatory taking, and both 
won and lost appeals on the claim that the fee failed a nexus and proportionality 
test under the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Council and Dolan v. City o/Tigard. At least one (federal district) court held 
that because petitioners had not sought and been denied just compensation in 
state court, the claim was unripe under Williamson County. It was here that the 
preclusion issue before the U.S. Supreme Court became relevant. Petitioners 
reserved some of their claims in federal court and then went to state court as 
directed, where eventually the California Supreme Court decided against 
Petitioners on their substantive takings claims (by applying, not an intermediate 
standard of review, but only a reasonable relationship standard, and so finding 
the in lieu fee reasonable). When Petitioners then returned to federal court, 
having satisfied their Williamson County ripeness obligation, the federal district 
court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1738-the full faith and credit statute-required 
federal courts to give preclusive effect to any state court judgment that would, 
337. San Remo, 545 U.S. 323 at 326. 
338. [d. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Neither was it addressed by the federal courts below nor 
raised before the Court by the parties, as correctly noted by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion. 
[d. 
339. [d. at 327. 
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in turn, have preclusive effect under the laws of that state. Therefore, because 
California courts had interpreted the relevant substantive state takings law at 
the same time as federal takings law (although petitioner had expressly reserved 
some of its federal claims), petitioners' federal claims were the same as those 
already resolved in state court. It followed that petitioners were thus precluded 
from re-litigating those claims in federal court. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed,34o and so the narrow issue made its way to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
After reviewing the history of the full faith and credit statute following its 
adoption in 1790 and finding that it implemented the U.S. Constitution's Full 
Faith and Credit Clause,34l the Court noted that "This statute has long been 
understood to encompass the doctrines of res judicata, or 'claim preclusion' and 
collateral estoppel, or 'issue preclusion.' "342 The Court then observed that in 
the case's present posture, the Court had "only one narrow question to decide: 
whether we should create an exception to the full faith and credit statute" in 
order to "provide a federal forum for litigants who seek to advance federal 
takings claims that are not ripe" under Williamson County.343 The Court held 
that it should not. 
After disposing of the narrow full faith and credit issue, the Court declared 
that Petitioners overstated the reach of Williamson County by suggesting that 
they were required to raise facial challenges in state court under the rule of that 
case. First, since facial takings challenges request relief "distinct from the 
provision of 'just compensation,' " the Court said that petitioners could have 
raised them directly in federal court without needing to first raise them in state 
court. Alternatively, petitioners could have reserved their facial claims while 
pursuing their as-applied claims. Second, the Williamson County requirement 
that aggrieved property owners must seek compensation through state 
procedures did not preclude state courts from hearing simultaneously a claim 
that, in the alternative, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth 
Amendment. As a result, there was "scant precedent" for such litigation in 
federal court. Indeed, the Court observed that most of the cases in its takings 
jurisprudence had come to the Court on writs of certiorari from state courts of 
last resort that "undoubtedly have more experience than federal courts do in 
resolving the complex factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning 
and land-use regulations.,,344 In sum, whether or not it is "unfair to give 
preclusive effect to state-court proceedings that are not chosen, but are instead 
340. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco City & Cnty .. 364 F.3d \088 (9th Cir. 2004). 
341. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 336 (2005). The statute provides in 
relevant part: 'judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United 
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ... " Id 
(internal quotations omitted). 
342. Id 
343. Id at 337. 
344. ld at 347. 
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required in order to ripen federal takings claims" the Court was not free to 
disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve the availability of a 
federal forum."345 
In sum, the Court in San Remo narrowly ruled that federal courts may not 
carve out an exception to the federal full faith and credit statute, particularly for 
regulatory taking cases, unless Congress so allows, either explicitly or 
implicitly. Therefore a petitioner in San Remo Hotel's posture is precluded 
from raising issues litigated in federal court that it previously litigated in state 
court, even though forced into state court in order to "ripen" the case under the 
rule of Williamson County. The language elsewhere in the opinion makes it 
likely that the majority would permit preclusion under other circumstances as 
well, although a five-justice opinion of the Court is perhaps a slender reed upon 
which to rely for much beyond the holding itself. In any event, the Court makes 
it clear that there is no right to hear a regulatory taking claim in federal court, 
whether a landowner is forced into state court under preclusion principles or 
not. It is also clear that the Williamson County ripeness barrier to bringing 
regulatory takings claims remains intact-at least for now. Clearly Chief 
Justice Rehnquist would have liked to have revisited at least the second-state 
compensation-prong, and he wrote for four concurring members of the Court. 
As discussed below, a number of federal appeals courts appear to agree with 
the late Chief Justice. 
The Supreme Court has yet to explicitly revisit Williamson County. 
However, the Court has, in recent decisions, used language that highlights the 
fact that Williamson County is "a discretionary, prudential ripeness 
doctrine."346 For example, in the 2010 decision of Stop the Beach 
Renourishment Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, the Supreme 
Court considered a case in which beachfront landowners alleged an inverse 
condemnation after the state undertook a beach re-nourishment project that 
deprived them oftheir littoral rights and rights to accretion.347 The Court made 
short work of the respondents' attempt to argue that the taking claim was not 
ripe because the petitioners had not sought just compensation in state court, 
holding that the ripeness objection was not brought in the writ for certiorari, 
was not jurisdictional, and was therefore waived.348 In the 2013 decision of 
Horne v. u.s. Department of Agriculture,349 the Court again clarified that 
"prudential ripeness" is "not, strictly speaking, jurisdictional.,,350 In a footnote 
345. Id. 
346. 1. David Breemer, The Rebirth of Federal Takings Review? The Courts' "Prudential" Answer to 
Williamson County's Flawed State Litigation Ripeness Requirement, 30 TOURO L. REv. 319, 339 (2014). 
347. Id. at 729-30. This case is discussed in greater detail in the "public trust Lucas background 
principles" section of this paper. See supra note Part IV.A.I. 
348. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S. at 729. 
349. 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013). This case is discussed in greater detail in the development conditions section 
of this Article. See supra Part X 
350. Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2062. 
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to the opinion, the Court further explained that a "[ c ]ase or [c ]ontroversy exists 
once the government has taken private property without paying for it. 
Accordingly, whether an alternative remedy exists does not affect the 
jurisdiction of the federal court.,,351 Commentators speculate that the Supreme 
Court, by emphasizing the prudential nature of the doctrine, has paved the way 
for lower federal courts to relax the ripeness requirements.352 
Given the direction of a number of Federal Circuits following San Remo, 
Stop the Beach, and Horne, it is clear that the Williamson County ripeness rule 
has in fact been substantially diluted, at least with respect to the state litigation 
exhaustion requirement. First, many courts are recasting the ripeness doctrine 
as mostly prudential rather than jurisdictional. Second, courts are increasingly 
loath to apply at least the second state action prong, at least in part to avoid 
lengthy delays in getting to the merits of a regulatory taking claim. Presumably 
these trends are likely to continue, and one can logically expect the U.S. 
Supreme Court to confirm these directions, taking the late Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's suggestion that the rule be reviewed, changed, and clarified. 
A. Prong Two: The State Litigation Requirement 
The federal circuits are in some disarray over the application of the 
ripeness doctrine with respect to prong two (the state compensation remedy 
litigation requirement). J. David Breemer recently summarized the present 
state of the law, such as it is, for a symposium held at the Touro Law School in 
the fall of 2013.353 The breakdown, updated to reflect subsequent 
developments, is as follows: 
The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits consider the state 
litigation requirement to be prudential and not jurisdictional. An excellent 
example of the trend towards "prudential" ripeness is the Federal Appeals Court 
of the Fourth Circuit's 2013 decision of Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko.354 
Town of Nags Head, was essentially a coastal zone/state public trust case 
dealing with the applicability of a local ordinance forbidding 
construction/reconstruction of private homes on state public trust lands, 
together with some nuisance issues, following damage to the homes in the 
Town of Nags Head, on a barrier island (the outer banks) of North Carolina. 
The Fourth Circuit took a very narrow approach in defining ripeness, a defense 
raised by the Town in response to plaintiffs' claim that the Town's ordinance 
constituted a regulatory taking of property under the Fifth Amendment. The 
Court first reiterated that ripeness is a "prudential rather than a jurisdictional 
351. ld. at n.6 (internal quotations omitted). 
352. Supra note 346; Breerner at 339 (2014). 
353. Id. at 340-41. 
354. 728 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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rule."355 Second, the Court held that a federal court could therefore exercise 
discretion concerning when to apply it. Third, the Court refused to apply the 
second prong of the ripeness rule, which requires a regulatory taking claimant 
to first litigate its claim in state court: "This is a proper case to exercise our 
discretion to suspend the state-litigation requirement of Williamson County. In 
the interests of fairness and judicial economy, we will not impose further 
rounds of litigation on the Toloczkos.,,356 
In the closely related decision of Town of Nags Head v. Sansotta,357 the 
Fourth Circuit dismantled the notorious removal "ripeness trap" by holding that 
the town automatically waived ripeness arguments when it removed to federal 
court.358 In Rosedale Missionary Baptist Church v. New Orleans City,359 the 
Fifth Circuit overturned previous decisions that found ripeness to be strictly 
jurisdictional, holding that "ripeness requirements are merely prudential."360 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit considered its complicated history with Williamson 
County's ripeness requirement, and ultimately determined that ripeness appears 
to be prudential rather than jurisdictional.,,36I In Sherman v. Town of 
Chester,362 the Second Circuit reversed its previous stance on the issue, 
holding, "because Williamson County is a prudential rather than a jurisdictional 
rule, we may determine that in some instances, the rule should not apply and 
we still have the power to decide the case.,,363 
Most recently, the Sixth Circuit has recognized the prudential nature of 
the state litigation requirement. In Wilkins v. Daniels,364 the Court considered 
whether to dismiss an inverse condemnation case in which the appellants had 
not previously sought compensation in state court: 
Ordinarily this would end our inquiry. However, Williamson County Ripeness 
is a prudential doctrine. The requirement to seek compensation prior to bringing 
suit will often serve important federalism interests. In regulatory takings cases 
involving sensitive issues of state policy, or cases that turn on whether the 
plaintiff has a property interest as defmed by state law, ripeness concerns will 
prevent a federal court from reaching the merits prematurely. But where it is clear 
that there has been no "taking" an issue of federal constitutional law, no 
jurisprudential purpose is served by delaying consideration of the issue. If 
anything, dismissing the case on ripeness grounds does a disservice to the 
federalism principles embodied in this doctrine as it would require the state courts 
355. Id. at 399. 
356. Id. 
357. 724 F.3d 533 (4th Cir. 2013). 
358. Id. at 544. 
359. 641 F.3d 86 (5th Cir. 2011). 
360. Id. at 88-89. 
361. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta. 638 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010); see also MHC Fin. Ltd. P'ship 
v. City of San Rafael, 714 F.3d 1118, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) cerl. denied, 134 S. Ct. 900 (2014) (holding that 
"[i]n this case, we assume without deciding that the claim is ripe, and exercise our discretion not to impose the 
prudential requirement of exhaustion in state court"). 
362. 752 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2014). 
363. Id. at 561. 
364. 744 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2014). 
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to adjudicate a claim, already before the federal court, that clearly has no merit. 
We therefore turn to whether the Act effects a taking.365 
99 
Interestingly, the Court appeared to regard the Williamson County 
ripeness requirements as a beneficial pillar of federalism. To that end, the Court 
narrowly ruled that the ripeness requirement could be waived in order to strike 
"clearly" unmeritorious takings claims. However, in doing so, the Court 
specifically recognized that the prudential ripeness doctrine did not serve as a 
jurisdictional bar. 
The Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have not yet concluded that the 
state litigation requirement is not a jurisdictional bar, although they have 
acknowledged that Williamson County is "rooted" in prudential ripeness. The 
Third Circuit recognized the prudential nature of the doctrine in County 
Concrete Corp. v. Township of Roxbury,366 yet in subsequent cases has 
continued to treat Williamson County as jurisdictiona1.367 To the same effect, 
the Seventh Circuit, in Peters v. Village ofClijton,368 noted that "Williamson 
County's ripeness requirements are prudential in nature," but went on to 
conclude that the "prudential character of the Williamson County requirements 
do not, however, give the lower federal courts license to disregard them.,,369 
The Seventh Circuit has yet to depart from this interpretation, consistently 
dismissing takings claims that have not first sought compensation in state 
court.370 Similarly, in Alto Eldorado Partnership v. County of Santa Fe,371 the 
Tenth Circuit accepted "the Supreme Court's characterization of the 
Williamson County requirements as 'prudential,' " but declined "the 
developers' invitation to ignore the ripeness requirements.,,372 The Tenth 
Circuit continues to treat Williamson County ripeness as jurisdictional,373 but 
at least one federal district court within the circuit has recently treated the 
requirements as prudentia1.374 
365. /d. at 418 (internal citations omitted). 
366. 442 F.3d 159 (3d Cif. 2006). "The ripeness doctrine serves 'to detennine whether a party has brought 
an action prematurely and counsels abstention until such time as a dispute is sufficiently concrete to satisty the 
constitutional and prudential requirements of the doctrine.'" [d. at 164. 
367. See, e.g., SB Bldg. Assocs., L.P. v. Borough ofMil1town, 457 F. App'x 154 (3d Cir. 2012). "Because 
we conclude that the remedies available under New Jersey law are adequate and the Plaintiffs have failed to 
exhaust their options in the New Jersey courts, they cannot satisfy the second prong of the test from County 
Concrete." [d. at 157-58. 
368. 498 F.3d 727 (7th Cif. 2007). 
369. Jd. at 734. 
370. See Everson v. City of Weyauwega, 573 F. App'x 599, 600 (7th Cif. 2014); Hendrix v. Plambeck, 
420 F. App'x 589, 591-92 (7th Cir. 2011); Waldon v. Wilkins, 400 F. App'x 75, 79 (7th Cir. 2010). 
371. 634 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2011). 
372. /d. at 1179. 
373. Gose v. City of Douglas, 561 F. App'x 723 (10th Cir. 2014). "The Goses could not bring their federal 
claims until they had exhausted the state inverse condemnation procedures. But, as we previously identified, 
the Goses cannot cure this jurisdictional defect." /d. at 725. 
374. River N. Props., LLC v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. \3-CV-01410-CMA-CBS, 2014 WL 1247813 
(D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2014). 
Although the Tenth Circuit has more recently held that the Williamson rule is prudential, it has often 
failed to finnly establish that the rule is exclusively so ... the Tenth Circuit's imprecise use of 
language on this issue has created a ripple effect of district court rulings holding that the Williamson 
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The First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits continue to apply the state 
litigation requirement as strictly jurisdictional. In Snaza v. City of Saint 
Paul,375 the Eighth Circuit rejected the notion of prudential ripeness, 
conclusively stating, "we have held that Williamson County is 
jurisdictional.,,376 The Eleventh Circuit also treats ripeness as a jurisdictional 
bar, explaining that ripeness "requires that state courts get the first shot, and the 
subsequent application ofthe Full Faith and Credit statute may mean that future 
plaintiffs are ultimately precluded from then proceeding to federal court.,,377 
Similarly, the First Circuit continues to adhere to the interpretation that the state 
litigation requirement implicates a federal court ability to exercise 
jurisdiction.378 
Despite the split among Circuits, there is evidence that the overall trend is 
towards recognition of Williamson County ripeness as a prudential doctrine, 
particularly with respect to the state litigation requirement. Within the last year 
the Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit have joined the ranks of federal appellate 
courts that no longer regard ripeness as a jurisdictional barrier. Circuits that 
staunchly uphold Williamson County as ajurisdictional rule face pressure from 
below, as district courts elect to apply the "prudential" interpretation advanced 
by other Circuits. For example, the District of Colorado in the Tenth Circuit 
and the District of Massachusetts in the First Circuit have both cited to the 
prudential nature of the doctrine and chosen to exercise jurisdiction over 
inverse condemnation actions, despite the arguably binding law to the contrary 
within their respective Circuits.379 In sum, it is clear that the second prong of 
the Williamson County ripeness requirement has been considerably weakened 
in recent years, and that this trend is likely to continue. 
B. Prong One- The Finality Requirement 
The first prong ofthe ripeness doctrine has its roots in Williamson County, 
rule exclusively implicates Article III ripeness and that applying the rule deprives a court of subject 
matter jurisdiction ... what drives the rule in Williamson has nothing to do with any jurisdictional 
or constitutional limitation on the judiciary's power. 
[d. at *5-6 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
375. 548 F.3d 1178 (8th Cir. 2008). 
376. Snaza v. City of Saint Paul, 548 F.3d 1178 (8th CiT. 2008); see also Dahlen v. Shelter House, 598 
F.3d 1007 (8th CiT. 2010). "We limit our analysis to the second requirement of Williamson . ... Failure to 
satisfY this requirement alone means that their claim is not ripe and that federal courts lack jurisdiction to 
entertain their claim." Id. at 1010. 
377. I 26th Ave. Landfill, Inc. v. Pinellas Cnty., 459 F. App'x 896, 900 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Agripost, 
LLC v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 525 F.3d 1049, 1051-55 (11th Cir. 2008); Watson ConstT. Co. v. City of 
Gainesville, 244 F. App 'x 274, 277 (II th Cir. 2007). 
378. Marek v. Rhode Island, 702 F.3d 650, 653-54 (I st Cir. 2012). "It follows inexorably that the plaintiff 
would have had to pursue this procedure fully in a state court before a federal court could exercise jurisdiction 
over his takings claim. His failure to do so was fatal to his federal takings claim." Id. at 654; see also 
Downing/Salt Pond Partners, L.P. v. Rhode Island & Providence Plantations. 643 F.3d 16,20 (I sl Cir. 2011). 
379. River N. Props., LLC v. City & Cnty. ofDenver, No. 13-CV-0141O-CMA-CBS, 2014 WL 1247813 
(D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2014); Athanasiou v. Town ofWesthamplon, No. 14-30029-KPN, 2014 WL 3418254 (D. 
Mass. July 14,2014). 
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where the Supreme Court held that a regulatory taking claim "is not ripe until 
the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached 
a final decision."380 The Court reasoned that the economic impacts of the 
challenged government action on distinct investment-backed expectations 
could not "be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, 
definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the 
particular land in question. "381 Therefore, the Court required the respondent to 
first seek administrative relief in the form of a variance in order to determine 
whether the government action was final and definitive. Over time, this 
language has been interpreted and developed by courts into a requirement of 
"finality"-the first prong of the Williamson County ripeness doctrine.382 
It appears that the first prong of the ripeness doctrine-finality-has not 
come under attack to the same extent as the state litigation requirement. Many 
courts regard the finality requirement as serving a legitimate purpose. As the 
Second Circuit recently reiterated: "The finality requirement . . . helps to 
develop a full record for review, limits judicial entanglement in constitutional 
disputes, and gives proper respect to principles offederalism."383 However, as 
discussed below, the courts have imposed limitations on this finality 
requirement, holding that a taking claim is ripe when requiring plaintiffs to 
pursue further administrative relief would be repetitive, unfair, or futile. 
Moreover, in practice there is considerable overlap between the two prongs of 
the ripeness doctrine,384 so the ongoing dilution of the state litigation 
requirement may also affect how courts treat the finality prong. 
The U.S. Supreme Court brought some clarity to the finality ripeness 
requirement in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island: 
While a landowner must give a land-use authority an opportunity to exercise its 
discretion, once it becomes clear that the agency lacks the discretion to permit 
any development, or the permissible uses of the property are known to a 
reasonable degree of certainty, a takings claim is likely to have ripened.385 
The Court also created an important safeguard against government abuse 
of the finality ripeness requirement by holding that governments may not 
"burden property by imposition of repetitive or unfair land-use procedures in 
order to avoid a final decision."386 Many saw Palazzolo as restoring a reasoned 
approach to ripeness issues, assuring fair access to federal courts for takings 
challenges when the proposed development is reasonably complete and the 
380. Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n Y. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 
(1985). 
381. Id. at 191. 
382. Michael M. Berger, The Ripeness Game: Why Are We Still Forced to Play?, 30 TOURO L. REv. 297, 
301-05 (2014). 
383. Kurtz v. Verizon N.Y. Inc.,758 F.3d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 2014). 
384. See, e.g., § 3532.1.1 Property Taking and Related Claims, 13B FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3532.1.1 
(3d ed.). 
385. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620 (2001). 
386. Id. at 620-21. 
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denial reasonably final. 387 
In his 2013 article The Ripeness Game: Why Are We Still Forced to 
Play?,388 Michael M. Berger identified and explained five distinct "branches" 
of the finality requirement that courts have tended to apply: (1) the property 
owner must apply for a specific use, (2) the property owner must make more 
than one application/there must be a meaningful application for use, (3) the 
property owner must apply for a variance, (4) the property owner must obtain 
a final determination of what the government will permit, and (5) the property 
owner must actually be injured by the application of the regulation.389 
Despite its pervasiveness, the finality requirement is not always an 
insuperable barrier to plaintiffs. Williamson County itself held that the finality 
requirement did not require that a plaintiff exhaust all administrative 
remedies.390 Plaintiffs need not resort to clearly remedial administrative 
,procedures, because the finality requirement of ripeness is satisfied when "the 
initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts 
an actual, concrete injury.,,391 
In the same vein, for the last twenty·five years many courts have observed 
a "futility" exception to the ripeness finality requirement. 392 According to the 
futility exception, "a property owner need not pursue ... applications when a 
zoning agency lacks discretion to grant variances or has dug in its heels and 
made clear that all such applications will be denied."393 For example, in 1990, 
the Ninth Circuit held that landowners need not apply for a variance when the 
city rejected their formal development application, and the city did not dispute 
that applying for a variance would have been futile since the proposed 
development did not conflict with the city's zoning ordinances or its general 
land use plan.394 Contemporary courts continue to recognize that the finality 
ripeness requirement is satisfied when pursuing further administrative remedies 
before proceeding to court would be futile.395 
387. See generally David L. Callies, Property Rights After Palazzolo: When What You Know Can Hurt 
You, 16 PROB. & PROP. 37, (2002). 
388. See BERGER, supra note 382. 
389. See generally id. 
390. Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985). 
391. [d. 
392. S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 504 (9th Cir. 1990). "While it is true that 
something called a 'futility exception' exists, this exception serves only to protect property owners from being 
required to submit multiple applications when the manner in which the first application was rejected makes it 
clear that no project will be approved." [d.; Southview Assocs., Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 98 (2d Cir. 
1992); Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51,60-61 (I st Cir. 1991); Eide v. Sarasota Cnty .. 908 F.2d 716, 
726 (II th Cir. 1990). 
393. Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n, 402 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2005). 
394. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1504--{)6 (9th Cir. 1990). 
395. See, e.g., Dominican Mgmt., LLC v. City of Arlington, 7 F. Supp. 3d 659, 665 (N.D. Tex. 2014). 
"Plaintiffs are correct that the law does not demand they make futile variance requests or reapplications before 
bringing a takings claim." [d.; Congregation Rabbinical Coli. ofTartikov, Inc. v. Vill. of Pomona, 915 F. Supp. 
2d 574, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Reverge Alsemo v. Cnty. of Shasta, No. 2:12-00361 WBS EFB, 2013 WL 
1934175 (E.D. Cal. May 9,2013); Clear Sky Car Wash, LLC v. City of Chesapeake, 910 F. Supp. 2d 861, 882 
2014] Through a Glass Clearly 103 
Moreover, several federal appeals courts have recently cited to Palazzolo 
in holding that the first prong of ripeness is satisfied when requiring the 
plaintiffs to pursue additional administrative steps to obtain a final decision 
would be repetitive and unfair. 396 The Second Circuit has characterized the 
unfair/repetitive exception as related to, but distinct from the futility exception 
in Sherman v. Town a/Chester, a case in which a developer brought an inverse 
condemnation claim, arguing that the town's endless imposition of red tape on 
a proposed subdivision project constituted a taking. The court characterized 
the claim as based on a "death by a thousand cuts" theory, and concluded that 
a final decision was unnecessary because the town's obstruction itself was 
allegedly a taking.397 In the words of the court: 
The Town will likely never put up a brick wall in between Shennan and the 
finish line. Rather, the finish line will always be moved just one step away until 
Sherman collapses. In essence, the Town engaged in a war of attrition with 
Sherman. Over ten years, Sherman was forced to spend over $5.5 million on top 
of the original $2.7 million purchase. As a result, he became financially 
exhausted to the point of facing foreclosure and possible personal bankruptcy. 
Moreover, at no point could Shennan force the Town to simply give a final "yay 
or nay" to his proposal. When asked at argument, the Town's counsel could not 
name one way Shennan could have appealed any aspect of the Town's decade of 
maneuvers in order to obtain a final decision. 
We are mindful that federal courts should not become zoning boards of 
appeal ... Every delay in zoning approval does not ripen into a federal claim. 
Unfortunately, it is no simple task to distinguish procedures that are merely 
frustrating from those that are unfair or would be futile to pursue. But when the 
government's actions are so unreasonable, duplicative, or unjust as to make the 
conduct farcical, the high standard is met. And it was met in this case.398 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In sum, while clarification would be useful in areas such as defining the 
relevant parcel and revisiting ripeness at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the 
parameters of regulatory taking are relatively clear. A partial regulatory taking 
is defined by the economic effect on the landowner and in particular that 
landowner's distinct or reasonable investment-backed expectations, together 
with the character of the government action. A total regulatory taking results 
when a regulation deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial use (not 
value) of the relevant parcel (whatever that is) unless the regulation codifies a 
nuisance or consists of a background principle of the relevant state's law of 
property, because perpetrating a nuisance or ignoring such a background 
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principle (public trust, custom, old statutes) is not a part of a landowner's title 
to begin with. Ripeness is increasingly recognized as a prudential, rather than 
a jurisdictional, bar to litigating a regulatory taking dispute. Physical takings 
law is even clearer, with public use now clearly equated with public purpose. 
However, the outer limits of public purpose are likely in play, and beyond the 
mere pretextual defense resulting in a naked transfer of title from one private 
owner to another. What will or may happen next is set out amply in the 
introduction to this article. Furthermore deponent sayeth not. 
